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The First Hungarian Settlements in Western
Canada: Hun’s Valley, Esterhaz-Kaposvar,
Otthon, and Bekevar
Jason F. Kovacs
Approximately a dozen Hungarian farming settlements were estab-
lished on the Canadian Prairies in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. Hungarian settlement was initiated through the
activities of one “Count” Paul O. Esterhazy whose relatively brief
activities as a special government agent for the promotion of Hun-
garian immigration to Canada (1885-1887) contributed to a sizeable
migration of Hungarians from the United States and Hungary to the
then sparsely populated Prairies. Hungarian settlements emerged in all
three of Canada’s Prairie Provinces, but were mainly concentrated in
what is now southeastern Saskatchewan and, initially at least, in
southwestern Manitoba. This paper provides historical overviews on
the first four of these colonies: Hun’s Valley, Esterhaz-Kaposvar,
Otthon, and Bekevar.
The paper begins with a short survey of the first settlement,
Hun’s Valley (1885), Manitoba; an ethnically mixed colony of
Hungarians, Slovaks, Poles, and others, established under the
leadership of agricultural expert, Géza de Döry under the auspices of
Esterhazy’s Hungarian immigration and colonization initiative. The
paper then addresses what is now commonly regarded as the first
Hungarian prairie settlement, Esterház-Kaposvár (1886); a settlement
that comprised what Esterhazy noted in his letters to Canadian govern-
ment officials as two distinct Hungarian colonies, “Esterház” (1886)
and the adjacent “Kaposvár” (1891), but which for various reasons are
now usually referred to using the latter place name or in the
hyphenated form. The paper then addresses the less well known
history of the small hamlet of Otthon (1894), Saskatchewan, before
concluding with an entry on what was once arguably the most cultural-
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ly vibrant Hungarian settlement outside of Europe: Békevár (1900),
Saskatchewan.
Hun’s Valley (1885), Manitoba
Associated names: New Hungary Colony, Hungarian Colony, Hun-
garian Valley, Hunsvalley. Known after 1921 as Polonia.
Location: 26 km northwest of Neepawa Manitoba. Rural Municipality
of Rosedale. Township 16, Range 16, W1 (50.388935 N, -99.618857
W)
Hun’s Valley was the first, at least partly Hungarian settlement
established as a part of Paul O. Esterhazy’s attempt to create a “New
Hungary” on the Canadian Prairies. While Hun’s Valley did not
become a lasting centre of Hungarian influence, the settlement paved
the way for the establishment of the Esterház colony and other Magyar
settlements in the Prairie West. In early August 1885, Count Géza S.
de Döry (1837-1895), an agricultural expert, Hungarian nobleman and
principal assistant to Paul Esterhazy, settled over a dozen Magyar and
Slavic families (mainly Slovaks) there from Pennsylvania.
The group of settlers that de Döry led to Manitoba in 1885
comprised 38 families recruited by Esterhazy in the eastern mining
region of Pennsylvania. The land they were assigned was spread out.
The Manitoba and North-Western Railway gave up three of its odd-
numbered sections (17, 21, 33) in the valley of Stony Creek so de
Döry’s settlers could build their houses more closely together. The
railway company also provided a $4000 loan for the purchase of
agricultural implements and farm animals. During the first winter the
settlers gained supplementary income cutting cordwood and burning
charcoal for the railway company. In subsequent years, they traded
loads of poplar cordwood cleared from their land for supplies in
Neepawa. Rather than enter for homestead lands, more than half of the
original group sought work opportunities elsewhere. However, the
population of the “New Hungary Colony” was augmented shortly after
its establishment with the arrival of a second smaller group of families
from Pennsylvania. By the end of 1885, 17 colonists (43 individuals)
had filed homestead entries and had begun working their land.
Within a year of its establishment the future of Hun’s Valley
looked promising. A number of log houses and stables had been
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erected, a petition for a post office had been approved, preparations for
the construction of a schoolhouse were under way, and a village site
was being surveyed. Eight additional homestead entries had been filed
by 1889 at which time the settlement encompassed about 2,000 acres,
only a fraction of which had actually been cleared. A land inspector
noted in his report that considerable clearing of underbrush and cutting
of trees still remained to be done before a substantial amount of grain
and crops could be cultivated. De Döry argued in an initial report that
his settlers had the hardest part of the country to cultivate but gave a
promising account of the agricultural potential of the area based on his
own preliminary farming achievements. In 1893, his colony consisted
of 29 families, 122 people in all. Collectively, the land under cultiva-
tion grew from just over 112 acres in 1889 to 300 acres four years
later. The settlement also had 60 horses and 200 head of cattle.
To meet their spiritual needs, the first settlers constructed a
small Catholic church in 1887-88. Missionary priests visited inter-
mittently. To cope with a growing congregation, the larger St. Eliza-
beth of Hungary Church was built and a year later, in 1903, Hun’s
Valley received its first resident priest, Fr. Ernest Kistorz. However,
by then a number of Magyar as well as Slovak settlers had already left
the colony for better lands further west. In fact, most of the original
families gradually left after the death in 1895 of the colony’s leader,
Géza de Döry. Polish settlers arrived to take their place beginning in
the late 1890s. As a reflection of the changes in the ethnic composition
of the farming district, the name of the settlement and its post office
were officially changed in 1921 to Polonia.1
Esterház-Kaposvár (1886), Saskatchewan
Location: immediately north of the Qu’Appelle Valley in southeast
Saskatchewan, 5 1/2 km south of present-day Esterhazy.
Rural Municipality of Fertile Belt No. 183. Township 19, Ranges 1 &
2, W2 (50.605002 N, -102.085467 W)
Esterház became the second colony after Hun’s Valley MB to be
established under the direction of Paul O. Esterhazy, a.k.a. Count
Esterhazy (1831-1912) during his employment as special agent for
Hungarian immigration to Canada (1885-1887). Esterház (later known
as Kaposvár) served as an important transitional shelter for subsequent
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groups of Hungarian immigrants who arrived in the Canadian Prairies
up to the 1920s. Its success helped pave the way for further Eastern
and Central European settlement in the Prairies, and the foundation of
Esterház-Kaposvár is now recognized by Parks Canada as a national
historic event. However, little remains of the colony other than an
impressive stone church which continues to serve as an important
spiritual site for descendants of the pioneer settlers.
Named after a historical seat of the Esterhazy family, Esterház
was founded by some 35 families of predominantly Magyar ethnicity.
The colonists had been provided with free transportation from Toronto
to Winnipeg, and Esterhazy secured a loan of $25,000 on their behalf
to build houses and purchase farming equipment and cattle. In
addition, Esterhazy negotiated to have both even-numbered and certain
odd-numbered adjacent sections of land available for his settlers.
Ordinarily, those odd-numbered sections would have been reserved for
the future use of railways. However, if they were available to settlers,
then a more compact settlement pattern resembling the villages they
were used to was possible. Early colonists initially situated their frame
houses close to their neighbours’ homes in clusters of four at the centre
of each section.
While the almost immediate establishment of a post office
indicated a promising future for the settlement, problems soon
emerged. Another group of about 60 settlers recruited by Esterhazy
left Pennsylvania for the North-West without his instruction. Mean-
while, a prairie fire destroyed much of the colony’s supplies making
the absorption of the approaching group impossible. Esterhazy stopped
them from going to the colony during the winter months and instead
found them temporary employment at a mine near Medicine Hat.
However, the Hungarians felt that they were being taken advantage of
by the contractors at the mine so they left for the immigrant shed at
Medicine Hat. At about the same time, a number of Hungarian
families destined for the west arrived in Montreal penniless, having
been swindled of their money by a steamship agent in Hamburg. To
make matters even worse, the exceptionally cold winter of 1886-87
proved too much for the majority of the Esterház colony’s settlers who
lacked adequate shelter, food, winter clothing, timber and hay. They
left for the immigrant sheds of Brandon and Winnipeg, and later
returned to the United States. Even though these events were largely
beyond Esterhazy’s control, his employment with the Department of
Agriculture was terminated. Nonetheless, Esterhazy continued to
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encourage Hungarian settlement in Canada from his residence in New
York.
The Esterház colony was saved from total collapse with the
arrival in the spring of 1888 of more than twenty families from Hun-
gary. By the end of 1891 all debts had been paid off and the Hungari-
ans, numbering around 350, were portrayed as model settlers in a
government report. Correspondence between settlers and their relatives
and friends in Pennsylvania and abroad encouraged the growth of the
farming settlement. By 1904 at least 125 homesteads had been taken
up in the Esterház district and the population of the colony reached
900. Hungarians formed the majority of the population, though there
was also a large Czech and significant Slovak presence. In fact, the
establishment of a second post office in 1891 (Sec.4, Twp 19, R1, W2)
pointed to solidifying ethnic boundaries within the district. The new
post office named “Kaposvar,” after a city in Hungary with large
Esterhazy estates, was situated in the predominantly Hungarian
populated eastern section of the settlement with the original post office
named “Esterhaz” (Sec.2, Twp.19, R2, W2) becoming increasingly
seen as an integral part of the growing Czech colony (the Esterhaz post
office was renamed with a Czech place name in 1903). Kaposvár
quickly became associated as the first Hungarian colony, and the
Esterház place name faded in importance after a new railway station
(1902) and village (1903) to the north of the colony were named
“Esterhazy” in honour of the “Count’s” colonization work.
In 1902 Paul Esterhazy was once again employed temporarily
by the Canadian government to develop a promotional pamphlet
showcasing the prosperity of the pioneers of Esterház-Kaposvár.
Personal accounts and photographs highlighted their material success.
The inclusion of a supporting letter written by the colony’s German-
born parish priest, Reverend Francis Woodcutter, signalled the
important spiritual dimension of the then thriving farming colony.
Unlike most Catholic Hungarian parishes in Saskatchewan, Kaposvár
had its own priest, one who tried to advance the development of the
colony. Woodcutter was responsible for establishing a stone rectory
(1900) in the colony. His successor, the Belgian priest Father Jules
Pirot, undertook an even more ambitious project: to replace the
colony’s wooden church with a stone church, Our Lady of Assumption
(1907). In 1915, the congregation received the first of a number of
Hungarian priests and Kaposvár became regarded as a centre of
Hungarian Catholic influence in Canada.
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The farming settlement remained a strong cultural island
throughout the interwar period as evidenced by the colony’s grand
golden jubilee celebration. However, outmigration, especially follow-
ing the Second World War, coupled with the lack of cultural
institutions and an increasing rate of inter-ethnic marriage contributed
to the erosion of what remained of the ethnic district. Owing to
continued population loss and the growth of the nearby village-turned-
town of Esterhazy, the church was closed for regular service in 1961
and with that the Kaposvár settlement in many ways ceased to exist.
Otthon (1894), Saskatchewan
Location: 14 km southwest of Yorkton, Saskatchewan. Rural Munici-
pality of Cana No. 214. Township 24, Ranges 4, 5 & 6, W2
(51.096466 N, -102.597936 W)
Otthon was founded by Reverend János Kovács, also the founder of
the First Hungarian Reformed Church of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. It
was the second oldest Magyar settlement in Canada after Esterház-
Kaposvár, if the ethnically mixed Hun’s Valley settlement is omitted
from consideration. Otthon means “home” in Hungarian. A small
hamlet remains at the heart of the old Hungarian colony.
In January 1894 Rev. Kovács wrote a letter that was published
in the most popular Hungarian language newspaper in the United
States at the time, Amerikai Nemzetör (American Home Guard). It
claimed that some of his congregation had wrongly accused him of
misappropriating funds for the construction of his church. According-
ly, he declared his intention to leave Pittsburgh and organize a group
of Hungarians with the purpose of establishing a farming settlement in
the Canadian prairies at a suitable location suggested by Canadian
authorities. His plan was undoubtedly influenced by Paul O. Ester-
hazy’s earlier work in settling the Esterház colony, as well as by his
own back-to-nature philosophy. In particular, the reverend believed
that farming was a far better option than the constant danger and
“moral corruption” that the Hungarian immigrant faced working in the
small mining towns of Pennsylvania.
A follow-up letter in March written by the editor of
the Amerikai Nemzetör warned readers that while 150 people had
already expressed interest in leaving Pennsylvania, they and others
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needed to be fully aware that they could in no way expect to “find
manna in readiness and milk, honey and beer flowing in the river
beds.” He further warned that “shirkers should not join” Rev. Kovács’
co-operative land settling enterprise and potentially repeat what had
occurred eight years earlier when many of the first Hungarian settlers
destined for the colonization initiative at Esterház returned weeping
from the hardships they endured during their first winter in Canada. It
seems the warning was effective because only about four or five
families moved to the Yorkton area that April of 1894.
Rev. Kovács rented a small house for the settlers until they
could complete the task they undertook cooperatively of building
temporary sod hut dwellings in the forested area that was to be theirs.
In the winter of 1895, Rev. Kovács wrote a number of letters that were
widely circulated, including in the press, giving details about how to
acquire free homestead land, the cost of livestock, the superior quality
of the new land in Canada, and life in general by contrast to what was
offered in the United States. Not only were these letters read by
Hungarian immigrants in the United States, but also by many of their
relatives and friends in Hungary. As a result, Rev. Kovács and his
initial followers were soon joined by a dozen or so families from the
U.S. as well as eight families directly from Hungary.
The chief Canadian supporter of Rev. Kovács’ plan to settle
some fifty Hungarian families of the Reform (Calvinist) faith was Rev.
Theodore Teitelbaum of Saltcoats (near Yorkton, Saskatchewan), a
Church of England clergyman and son of a refugee of the failed 1848-
49 Hungarian War of Independence. The initiative gained the additi-
onal support of Dr. James Robertson, Superintendent of Presbyterian
Missions in Western Canada.
Although the first group of settlers were of the Reformed faith,
subsequent groups also included Catholics and Baptists. For most of
the first decade of its existence no permanent congregation of any
denomination could be organized in the colony. Before their church
was built in 1905, services for Reformed-Presbyterians were con-
ducted in Reverend Kovács’ house, and later in the homes of two
settlers. Otthon’s Catholic church was built in East Otthon where most
of the Catholic Hungarians had settled. It was consecrated in 1903.
The first institution in Otthon was the post office (Sec. 36,
Twp. 24, R. 5, W2) and Rev. Kovács served as the colony’s first
postmaster from 1896 to 1898. Upon the Reverend’s resignation, the
post office was briefly closed, reopening in 1899 at a new location
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(Sec. 14, Twp. 24, R. 5, W2). Six postmasters served there until its
closure in 1968. Rev. Kovács’ letter of resignation as postmaster in
late 1897 may have been linked to the growing alienation that he was
facing in his new home and adopted country, particularly following a
conflict he had with the Presbyterian Church of Canada. The conflict
led not only to a reprimand and loss of an annual subsidy, but also to
the departure of several members of his flock. The founder of Otthon
left his colony and Canada at the beginning of the twentieth century.
The Reformed congregation of Otthon received a promising
replacement with a theological student from Hungary, but he left after
no more than two years service. Then Lajos Kovácsi, a former teacher
in Hungary who had become a missionary for the Canadian Pres-
byterian Church, arrived in about 1905 and provided the colony with
strong leadership in both the religious and ethno-cultural sense for two
years. He and his older brother, Rev. Kálmán Kovácsi, were respon-
sible for establishing the Canadai Magyar Testvéri Szövetség (Canadi-
an Hungarian Fraternal Association) in 1910, a supracommunal
organization jointly based out of Winnipeg, Manitoba and Békevár,
Saskatchewan. It served Hungarian interests such as the promotion of
bilingual (English Hungarian) schooling. A branch of the short-lived
organization was established in Otthon that same year.
Despite the relatively short time spent in the colony, Lajos
Kovácsi seemed to have helped awaken the Otthonians from their
apparent indifference to cultural activities. In particular, like his older
brother in Békevár, Lajos actively promoted the cult of Lajos Kossuth,
leader of the 1848-49 Hungarian War of Independence. He delivered
patriotic speeches on Hungarian national memorial days, March 15
and October 6. Following his departure, a number of other ministers
served Otthon’s Reformed congregation before Lajos’ older brother
Kálmán – a capable orator, leader and poet – arrived in 1911 to act as
minister. Kálmán Kovácsi, too, was succeeded by other Reformed
Hungarian ministers. Unlike the Calvinists, the Hungarian Catholics of
Otthon were not as fortunate in the matter of obtaining their own
clergy. Their church was often served by visiting priests from the
Esterház-Kaposvár settlement.
The Otthon colony had two schools, the first of which was
established in 1899. It also had the Rákóczi Orchestra, formed in 1905
and named after the leader of an earlier Hungarian War of Inde-
pendence in 1703-1711. An important social event in Otthon was the
mid-summer picnic. The first of many picnics was arranged by the
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Reformed congregation in 1912. It was geared to all members of the
community, irrespective of religious and ethnic background. Many
other important occasions for communal eating, dancing, music-
making and singing existed, usually tied to religious dates and events
such as Christmas, Pentecost and Easter, particular saints’ days,
baptisms and weddings.2
Békevár (1900), Saskatchewan
Associated name: New Botrágy
Location: 9 km southeast of Kipling, Saskatchewan. Rural Municiality
of Hazelwood No. 94. Township 12, Ranges 4 and 5, W2 (50.023633
N, -102.599095 W)
Békevár means “fortress of peace” or alternatively “peace awaits you.”
It was the largest and one of the most prosperous Hungarian farming
settlements in the Prairie West. It was populated primarily by members
of the Reformed (Calvinist) Church and, to a lesser extent, by Baptists.
Similar to the symbolic role played by its Catholic counterpart,
Esterház-Kaposvár, the Békevár settlement was regarded by genera-
ions of Hungarian Calvinists in Western Canada as their spiritual
centre. The settlement was also a strong and, in many ways, unique,
centre of Hungarian culture in Canada. In particular, Békevár re-
sembled a traditional Hungarian peasant community in that a rich array
of traditions and folk customs were cultivated and maintained in the
new setting for several decades.
János (John) Szabó (1853-1925), who founded Békevár, had
been employed in the mid-1890s as a coal miner in Pennsylvania. Like
many other Hungarian immigrants, Szabó viewed the backbreaking
and dangerous work in the mine as a short-term measure to build up
enough capital to purchase land in the old country. While in
Pennsylvania, however, Szabó read a series of published letters written
by the Rev. János Kovács of Otthon touting the great farming
opportunities in the Canadian Prairies. Upon learning of his wife’s
death back in his native village of Botrágy (in Bereg County, north-
astern Hungary, now Berehove Raion, Ukraine), Szabó quit his job
and returned home in 1897. He subsequently sold all his belongings
and left for Canada in the spring of 1898 with his two sons and
daughter, a new wife and one of her children.
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He went first to Esterház-Kaposvár but because there was no
land available there he rented land near Whitewood until he could find
a suitable location to establish his own colony. Szabó’s settlement plan
was utopian in the sense that he intended to recreate Botrágy on the
Canadian prairies by transferring a large part of his native village
there. He wanted to improve the lives of his co-villagers, and a great
many planned to join him. A letter dated 15 August 1899 sent to the
Department of the Interior indicated the intention of 55 or more
families to emigrate to Canada once Szabó had secured a suitable area
for mixed farming.
In the summer of 1900, with the aid of Hungarian agronomist
János Faragó, Szabó located southwest of Whitewood what he thought
would be an ideal place to establish his “New Botrágy.” They marked
out the boundaries of the first house of the colony on July 20, a
foundational date that was to be commemorated annually by the
descendants of the pioneer settlers. Szabó subsequently sent letters
back to his village informing his relatives and friends about everything
from the size of acquirable lands for cultivation and grazing to the
costs of houses and stables. Over the course of the next three years
several small waves of settlers brought 38 families to the colony.
While a large proportion of these and later settlers came from Szabó’s
native village, others soon arrived from other villages in the northeast
as well as elsewhere in the Hungarian Kingdom especially the Kunság
and Trans-Danubia. Szabó’s farming settlement had a population of
1,578 by 1916, and new settlers continued to arrive as late as 1930. Its
name, Békevár, was adopted in 1902. In 1904 the “Bekevar” post
office was established.
Szabó acted as both leader and unofficial settling agent. The
“Moses of Békevár” as he was to be later remembered, advised and
helped secure and locate quarter sections for newcomers and offered
much of his time, in spite of his own work, aiding those who could not
take care of themselves. He also helped secure the colony’s first
minister, Rev. Kálmán Kovácsi (1873-1931) in 1901 with the help of
Dr. James Robertson, superintendent of Presbyterian missions.
Rev. Kovácsi’s sermons were initially held in the homes of
settlers, later in school buildings, until in 1912 the Békevár Reformed
Church was opened. The architectural design for the twin-spired
wooden structure was likely inspired by either the Reformed Great
Church of Debrecen, in the so-called Calvinist Rome of Hungary, or
possibly the Romanesque parish church of Ják in western Hungary.
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Rev. Kovácsi was credited with introducing two controversial
movements during his nearly decade-long stay in Békevár. One was a
prairie-wide initiative to promote bilingual English-Hungarian school-
ing. He worked on this with his younger brother, Lajos, a missionary
in Winnipeg. Their cause resulted in the Winnipeg-based Canadai
Magyar Szövetség (Canadian Hungarian Association), established in
1908, with its first branch in Békevár; and a similarly short-lived
organization, the Canadai Magyar Testvéri Szövetség (Canadian Hun-
garian Fraternal Association), established in 1910.
The second controversial initiative was a quasi-cultic move-
ment called spiritism. Rev. Kovácsi returned to Canada after a visit to
Hungary in 1907 as a convert to spiritism, a movement that promoted
faith healing and belief in the possibility of communicating with the
spirits of the dead. With the support of Szabó, he established a thriving
but short-lived spiritist movement in the Békevár colony. In particular,
under his guidance, adherents of spiritism formed the lay fraternity,
Keresztyén Spiritisták Egylete (Christian Spiritists’ Society). The spi-
ritist organization was highly controversial as its presence suggested
that the church could not cater fully to the spiritual needs of the
Calvinist congregation. In fact, the spiritist movement left the com-
munity in strife and divided. The pro-spiritist faction in Békevár began
to use the Kossuth School for its meetings while the anti-spiritist
faction used the Rakoczi School in the adjacent township. Rev.
Kovácsi was eventually pressured by the anti-spiritist opposition to
leave the settlement in 1910. Although the Christian Spiritists’ Society
was dissolved the following year, the spiritist group continued to
function for some time. The spiritist movement, though organiza-
tionally short-lived, was eventually incorporated into local traditional
legends and it became a popular topic of conversation well into the
latter half of the century. It also had an influence on the settlement’s
small but very active Baptist congregation.
In 1911, four Baptist families in the colony constructed a
small wooden church adjacent to where the Reformed Church was
being built. A year later, the Baptists’ first minister, the Rev. János
Mónus, arrived. A number of Calvinist adherents of spiritism sub-
sequently joined Békevár’s new Baptist Church, which had already
been infiltrated from the start by traditional folk beliefs. Conversions
were undertaken in a large slough called Jordan-tó (Lake Jordan) and
the 14’ x 20’ church structure had to be enlarged in 1915 and again in
1918. By the time Rev. Mónus left in 1925, the congregation had 65
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baptized members and 109 children were attending Baptist Sunday
school. The Church continued to grow with new memberships from
both Békevár and the nearby village of Kipling.
Békevár was regarded as a leading centre of Hungarian
Canadian culture. In fact, it has been argued that Békevár was
culturally the richest Magyar settlement outside of Europe. Not only
were folkloric rites and rituals preserved (e.g. baptismal, marriage and
funeral customs), but the transplanted culture was further developed,
with new songs and poetry produced to address new circumstances.
The solid cultural foundation that included an array of folk traditions
and values was largely tied to the fact that the core population of
Békevár originated from the same village. Thus, systems of kinship
and co-villager groupings, as well as the archaic yet vibrant folk belief
system of turn-of-the-century Botrágy were transplanted, largely
intact, to the Canadian Prairies.
Rev. Kovácsi, a poet of some repute in Hungary, greatly facili-
tated Békevár’s development as a creative centre of folk-poets, prose
and drama writers, musicians and festivals. For example, the settle-
ment had a brass band and a succession of at least three string brands,
a choir, and at least two well-published writers. Committed to foster-
ing the anti-Habsburg Kossuth cult, the reverend-poet wrote patriotic
poems and speeches such as “A Szabadság Ünnepére” (On the festival
of freedom) for important annual events such as the Hungarian
National Day on March 15. He also oversaw the Önképzőkör (Self-
Training Circle), a cultural organization that helped nurture the
poetical and literary creativity of many of the pioneer settlers. Poetical
texts, short stories and even long epic poems were produced by the
early Békevárians, including works with such titles as the “Hymn of
Bekevar” and “The Conquest of our New Home.” A Self-Training
Circle for Youth (Ifjusági Önképzőkör) was also established to en-
courage the Canadian-born children to learn Hungarian poetry, song
and music. However, as with other Hungarian settlements in the
Canadian Prairies, the active reinforcement of Hungarian culture at the
heart of this settlement declined by the mid-twentieth century.3
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NOTES
The above entries on Hun’s Valley, Esterház-Kaposvár, Otthon, and Békevár
were originally published on the website of the Canadian Utopias Project:
Built Utopian Settlements to 1945 (canadianutopiasproject.ca). The author
would like to thank Beth Milroy (Professor Emirata, Ryerson University) for
her help in editing the original entries on these four settlements and for
providing permission to have them re-published in this issue of the Hun-
garian Studies Review. The author would also like to thank Nandor Dreisziger
for his help in reviewing the original entries that were submitted to the
Canadian Utopias Project and for suggesting that they be re-published in this
journal.
1 Prior to the death of de Döry, which likely contributed to the
demise of Hungarian presence in the farming settlement with outmigration,
there is evidence that some of the Hungarian settlers of the multi ethnic
colony attempted to bequest their native language to their children. In
particular, the first teacher of the the Hun’s Valley School District and first
post master of the area, Michael Ruby, offered Hungarian language instruc-
tion to the children of the pioneer settlers. A century later, the author of the
local history book Along the Hills to the Valley and descendant of one of the
few Magyar pioneer settlers who remained in the colony ensured that Ester-
hazy’s and de Döry’s contributions to the establishment of the settlement be
acknowledged on the centennial cairn of St. Elizabeth of Hungary church.
2 For more on Otthon, see M. Kovács (1980d), Dreisziger (1982),
Paizs (1928), and Ruzsa (1940).
3 The main studies upon which this entry is based are M. Kovacs
(1980a) and the edited collection of studies by R. Blumstock (1979). For
spiritism, religious mysticism and sectarianism in Békevár see L. Dégh
(1980) and her study in Blumstock’s edited volume. For examples of poetry
from Békevár see Kovacs (1980b). Shorter overviews with additional
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[W]e need to work on overthrowing the Horthy-rule. This is
not going to happen without outside pressure and actions:
[...] people have almost messianic expectations from Prague
and Vienna, from you and from us, waiting for [liberation].
Vilmos Böhm to Mihály Károlyi (Vienna, 3 September 1920)1
‘The backbone of my policy is a full agreement with the
Czechs. I can regard President Beneš, whom I know
for over 20 years, as a personal friend.
Mihály Károlyi to a Soviet diplomat (London, 8 June 1943)2
Abstract: This paper defines the main objectives, stages, and the dy-
namics of the secret cooperation of the democratic Hungarian opposi-
tion, hostile to the Horthy regime, with the government of Czecho-
slovakia. It focuses on the Prague’s contacts with Hungary’s Octob-
rists, social democrats (active both within the country and in exile) and
liberals. The paper covers mostly the period of the so-called consolida-
tion of the Horthy regime, carried out under the leadership of Prime
Minister István Bethlen. Our research concludes that the struggle of
the democratic opposition against the Horthy-Bethlen regime was con-
sistently encouraged by Czechoslovak political and diplomatic circles.
The collaboration between anti-Horthyist groups and Prague was parti-
cularly intense in 1919–1921 and in 1930–1931. Our study utilises
hitherto unknown documents from archives in Prague and Budapest, to
re-evaluate the causes of interwar tensions between Hungary and
Czechoslovakia — beyond their disputes over borders and disagree-
ments over the treatment of minorities.
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Following the dissolution of Austria-Hungary and a series of revoluti-
onary upheavals after the end of World War I, an authoritarian rule
under the regency of Miklós Horthy was established in Hungary in
1920. This conservative and nationalist regime forced its most ardent
domestic opponents to make a choice between a recognition of the
new government and emigration (mostly to neighbouring countries).
But the consolidation of the ‘counter-revolution’, as the circle around
Horthy proudly called their rule, did not eradicate the opposition in the
country. Relying on the public discontent with the Horthy’s regency
and with the support provided by foreign governments and political
parties, Hungarian oppositionists continued their attempts to democra-
tise Hungary throughout the 1920s. It was the neighbouring Czecho-
slovak Republic (hereafter the ČSR) that provided most active support 
to the anti-Horthyist circles, and this article strives to uncover the story
of the Czechoslovaks’ secret actions.
The official relations between Budapest and Prague in the in-
terwar period were far from trouble-free. The most important reason
for their disagreements was a territorial dispute over Slovakia and Sub-
carpathian Ruthenia, which had belonged to Hungary until the end of
the Great War. After these lands were incorporated into the ČSR in 
1918–1921, the vast majority of Hungary’s political establishment
looked forward their full or partial return. Budapest authorities main-
tained strong ties with anti-Prague opposition movements in Slovakia
and Subcarpathian Ruthenia, particularly among local Magyars. More-
over, Prague also had its own claims against Budapest (which con-
cerned certain territories and the position of Slovaks in Hungary), and,
apparently, it even saw Hungary as its potential sphere of influence.
The Prague-Budapest tensions reached their zenith during the border
rectifications in Slovakia and Ruthenia in 1938–1939.
The reading of the interwar realities through the prism of
“mixture of border and ethnic conflicts” seems to simplify the complex
relations between the post-WWI Czechoslovakia and Hungary. It ig-
nores the fact that both states were uninterested in escalating their dis-
putes excessively. Budapest had to take into consideration that Czech-
oslovakia far exceeded Hungary in terms of military potential and was
a member of the Little Entente – a military and political bloc that
guaranteed the ČSR Yugoslav and Romanian aid against Hungary. 
Furthermore, the ČSR was Hungary's second-largest trade partner be-
hind Austria, meaning that a rise of strife between them would greatly
damage the Horthyist economy. Prague, in turn, could not be sure that
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the population of its eastern provinces would remain loyal in case of
war and feared the possible interference of other regional states in the
conflict. In this context, and despite their numerous disagreements,
both Prague and Budapest worked towards the bilateral normalisation.
But, whenever diplomacy could not deliver desired results, the two
governments applied various soft power instruments of pressure on
each other, spreading the hostile propaganda or secretly supporting the
political opposition on the other side of the shared border.
Foreign interferences in domestic affairs, especially regarding
the interwar Central Europe, are often associated with the activities of
national minorities. The classical examples are the German or Magyar
minorities that sought a protection from Berlin or from Budapest re-
spectively, to counter-balance the power of majority.3 In the case of
Hungary-Czechoslovakia relations, a lot of scholarly attention has
been paid to the contacts between the Hungarian authorities and the
opponents of Prague among the Slovak and Magyar political parties in
the ČSR.4 While some historians see these relations as ‘justified’ and
‘natural,’ other condemn them. Labelled as the Horthyist interference
in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia, these relations were des-
cribed as proof of Budapest’ and national minorities ‘aggressive’ and
‘disloyal’ attitude to the Czechoslovak state, and considered one of
key reasons for persistent tensions between Budapest and Prague.
As the number of Slovaks in post-Trianon Hungary did not
reach 200 thousand, and were speedily Magyarised, ‘national-minded’
historians failed to notice a ‘pro-Czechoslovak strata’ inside the Hun-
garian political scene. Despite that the counter-revolutionary regime in
Hungary was challenged by a wide front of oppositional groups, the
issue of collaboration between these anti-Horthyist circles and the
government in Prague remains little studied.5 This paper aims to over-
come this gap by giving an outline of the stages, events, and substance
of the partnership between the Magyar democrats and the Czechoslo-
vak diplomacy. Also, it seeks to contribute to the scholarship by sug-
gesting that it is not necessarily the ‘national minority’ which acted as
an third pillar in the bilateral relations of neighbouring states, but ra-
ther the united opposition movement.
The scarcity of preserved primary sources is one of main prob-
lems for studying ‘secret cooperation’ between the opposition move-
ments and foreign governments. Aware of potential danger of present-
ing proofs of such cooperation, which could be used either as proof of
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‘foreign interference,’ ‘political venality’ or ‘national treason,’ the in-
volved parties tended to convey information on their plans and activi-
ties with the minimum of written records.6 For example, when the
Czechoslovak representative in Budapest, Milan Hodža, cabled to Pra-
gue in August 1919 that he would provide details which kind of action
should be taken regarding the republican parties with pro-Czech orien-
tation in Hungary only during his next visit to Prague.7 The question of
financial subsidies was hidden with special diligence, and sources con-
tain only allusions to it.8 Otherwise, the Hungarian journals were full
of different accusations against the opposition parties of accepting for-
eign funds, but it is almost impossible to verify them. For example, in
December 1930, the rightist press in Budapest published several letters
apparently exchanged between Hungarian socialist party leaders and
their Czechoslovak partners. The letters showed that the ČSR had been 
supplying the social democrats with money for their political struggle.9
Due to these scarcities or biases of sources, speculations about rela-
tions between the Hungarian opposition and the governmental circles
of Prague, and especially the funds involved, remain a very slippery
area for research.
At the same time, there is enough evidence of the existence of
‘special relationship’ between the Hungarian democrats and the
Czechoslovak authorities. First, the Hungarian émigrés maintained
extensive correspondence among them, and the letters of such figures
as Mihály Karolyi, Oszkár Jászi or Vilmos Böhm contain multiple ref-
erences to Prague’s support of their anti-Horthyist struggle. Second,
the Czech sources also mirror these relations. On one hand, they testify
to the extent of Prague’s support for the ‘democratisation’ of Hungary,
and the place that this issue occupied in official diplomatic relations
between Budapest and Prague. Finally, as the Horthyist regime kept an
open eye on the Czechoslovak relations of its domestic opponents, and
documents housed in the National Archives of Hungary shed some
additional light on this intricate problem.
Another challenge in studying unofficial relations between a
foreign state and Hungarian domestic opposition lays in terminology.
The word choice probably would be a reason for critique always as the
distinction between institutional or personal cooperation and hidden
manipulation is often very subtle. How to differentiate a foreign aid
from a foreign interference? Should the Czechoslovak financial assis-
tance to pay the legal fees during the trials over the social-democrats in
Hungary10 be considered a justified reason to call the anti-Horthyist
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activists ‘agents’ of the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Edvard Beneš?
Or should repeated Czechoslovak promises to encourage the establish-
ment of ‘democratic governance’ in Budapest be understood as Pra-
gue’s intention to meddle in internal affairs of a neighbouring country?
Much less innocent seems to be a Beneš advise to the left-wing émi-
grés to put an end to the counter-revolutionary regime by an ‘outright
rebellion’ in 1920, or Prague’s enthusiasm about the right-wing radical
István Friedrich’s plans in 1932 to stage a coup to overthrow Horthy.
Leaving the clarification of these and many other issues for
future research, this paper argues that the Hungarian democratic circles
maintained partnership with the governmental spheres in Prague
throughout the 1920s and that this relationship strongly affected the
internal politics in Hungary as well as bilateral Prague-Budapest dip-
lomatic relations. This research also concludes that the intensity of the
collaboration between the anti-Horthyist opposition in the ČSR in the 
1920s depended mostly on, first, the stability (or a lack thereof) of
Horthy’s regime, and, second, on the level of cordiality between cabi-
nets in Budapest and Prague. Whenever the counter-revolutionary au-
thorities had to confront a serious internal or external challenge, the
opposition would increase its pressure on the Horthy regime, pushing
it to loosen its authoritarian grip and carry out democratic reforms.
However, Prague provided support to the opposition only upon a seri-
ous consideration of the potential consequences, and the paper con-
cludes that the Hungarian opposition could not count on an unqualified
Czechoslovak support against the Horthy regime.
The paper focuses on the 1920s and early 1930s, covering the
period of the so-called consolidation in Hungary (1921–1931), carried
out under the leadership of regent Horthy's closest political ally –
Count István Bethlen. For one decade, the political system of the Hun-
garian 'kingdom without a king' remained surprisingly stable; its sym-
bol, apart from regent Horthy, was the long-standing Prime Minister,
István Bethlen. This Transylvanian aristocrat, who became head of the
government after the (ex-) King Charles IV Habsburg had attempted a
failed coup in March 1921, retained the reins of power until August
1931. The consolidation decade became so inextricably linked with the
Prime Minister's name that foreign diplomats used to call the Hungar-
ian ruling regime not only Horthyist, but also Bethlenist.11
Throughout the 1920s, the camp opposed to the Horthy-
Bethlen duo may be divided into three main groups: 1. democrats
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(composed in turn of the so-called liberals who were proponents of
democratic reforms; Octobrists – supporters of the Aster Revolution of
1918; and social democrats); 2. legitimists (who were calling for a
Habsburg restoration); and 3. ultra-right nationalists. All three oppose-
tion groups rejected the consolidation policy to various extent. On the
one hand, the Magyarországi Szociáldemokrata Párt (Social Democ-
ratic Party of Hungary, hereafter MSZDP) and the Octobrists (whose
leaders were in exile), as well as the largest liberal parties (Vilmos
Vázsonyi's Nemzeti Demokrata Párt (National Democratic Party, here-
after NDP), Károly Rassay's Party, as well as the Kossuth Party) prin-
cipally opposed the government; on the other hand, many of the le-
gitimists and radical nationalists (united around Gyula Gömbös) were
in favour of a peaceful coexistence with the regime. Part of the opposi-
tion existed on the edge of legality: for instance, the Magyarországi
Szocialista Munkáspárt (Socialist Workers Party of Hungary), which
in 1925–1928 acted as a cover for the illegal Communist Party of
Hungary; or the so-called Republican Party, repeatedly banned by the
authorities in the 1920s. The situation was further complicated by the
fact that both the democratic and the legitimist opposition saw as their
main political opponents not Bethlen's clique, but rather Gömbös and
his followers. The democrats disliked his chauvinism, anti-Semitism,
and anti-socialism (Gömbös was seen as responsible for many of the
'white terror' killings), while the legitimists were averse to his anti-
Habsburg position. Although the democrats and the legitimists held
opposing views on many social and political matters, they were united
in their demand for a ‘democratisation’ of the counter-revolutionary
regime by means of a universal secret suffrage.12
Hungarian democratic groups carefully maintained connec-
tions with ideologically close movements and political circles abroad.
The MSZDP was a member of the Second International and was well
connected to influential socialist parties abroad, such as those of Great
Britain, France, Austria, and the ČSR,13 while the Kossuth Party mem-
bers were very active in the Pan-Europe movement.14Apart from these
direct contacts, the Hungarian democrats maintained relations with
foreign partners through the left-wing émigrés who had left the coun-
try during the white terror in 1919–1920.15 Initially, a majority of these
refugees fled to Austria, but at the height of the Hungarian crisis, the
ČSR opened its borders to some of them. The Czechoslovak envoy in 
Vienna, Robert Flieder, reported to Prague in January 1920 that the
opportunity to obtain asylum in the ČSR put newly-exiled Magyars in 
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a pro-Czechoslovak mood. Flieder noted that the émigrés, who hated
the counter-revolutionary abuses of power, repeatedly offered their
services to Prague; thus, it became clear which among them could be-
come future intermediaries in the reconciliation between Czechoslova-
kia and Hungary.16
By the early 1920s the ČSR had become one of the main safe 
havens for the leftist Hungarian émigrés (apart from the Octobrists
Mihály Károlyi, József Diner-Dénes, and Rezső Krejcsi, and many 
former Magyar Communists, like Ignác Schultz; intellectuals such as
Lajos Bartha, Pál Ignotus and Jenő Gömöri also settled there), some of 
whom became involved in Czechoslovak politics (Hungarian cadres
occupied top positions in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia).17
The second wave of the Hungarian political emigration to Czechoslo-
vakia happened after stifling the February 1934 rebellion in Austria
that forced Magyar social-democrats to seek new asylum (such as
Vilmos Böhm, Jenő Horovitz, Pál Oroszlán, and Pál Szende). Among 
the political refugees, the move to the ČSR was made much easier for 
those who had the official residence in Northern Hungary (Slovakia or
in Subcarpathian Ruthenia) before 1918, and, thus, had a formal right
for Czechoslovak citizenship. However, the Czechoslovak asylum was
not as sure as the Hungarian émigrés may hope. When relations with
the Horthy regime were improving, Prague was inclined to loosen its
connections with the Magyar democrats. In 1920, in the background of
the normalisation of official Prague-Budapest relations, Karolyi was
invited to leave the republic. Many other Hungarian exiles also left the
ČSR. Similarly, those left-wing Hungarians, who were criticizing the 
Czechoslovak regime, were under the threat of expulsion. The ‘émi-
gré’ left-wing activist Lajos Surányi, who was even elected to the Pra-
gue parliament, was expelled as ‘foreigner’ to Hungary in 1929, and
became a zealous critique of the ‘Czechoslovak democracy.’ While the
Czechoslovak reception of refugees from Hungary laid foundations for
collaboration between Prague and the anti-Horthyist movement,18 the
importance of exiled Hungarian diaspora in the ČSR had significantly 
weakened by the end of the interwar period.
The Hungarian frondeurs made the Czechoslovak Republic
one of the main pillars of their activity for several reasons. First, the
disputes between official Prague and Budapest, although put on the
back burner, allowed the Hungarian opposition to view the ČSR as a 
potential ally against the counter-revolutionary regime. Second, anti-
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Horthyist and Czechoslovak circles had reasons for mutual sympathy:
Hungarians were attracted to the ČSR as the foremost 'democratic' 
state in the Danubian basin, while the Hungarian democrats' pleas for
aid against the Horthyist ‘oppression’ found a deep resonance among
the Czechoslovak socialists.19 As a MSZDP authority Ernő Garami 
argued, the rapprochement with two democratic neighbours, Czecho-
slovakia and Austria, had to strengthen the democratization of Hun-
gary.20 Otherwise, the promoters of the orientation towards Prague
usually stressed the economic interdependence between the former
Habsburg lands, especially Hungary, Austria and Czechoslovakia.21
As the influence of the Magyar democratic emigration was
diminishing throughout the 1920s, the role of the domestic opposition
to the counter-revolutionary rule was increasing. The main base for
independent political activity in Hungary was the Budapest Parliament
itself, to whose liberties Regent Horthy still showed outward respect.
The government reported to the parliament, which passed laws and
approved the budget. However, thanks to a series of machinations and
abuses of power by the Horthyist administration, the pro-government
Egységes Párt (Unified Party; headed by Bethlen) repeatedly won
two-thirds of all seats (in 1922, 1926, and 1931), which gave it full
control of the legislative branch.22 As a result, the opposition did not
regard the parliament as a fully legitimate legislative body. After the
1922 elections, the joint committee of the democratic deputies adopted
a declaration stating that ‘the National Assembly and its activities are
… unlawful.’23
The most influential among the democratic parties was the
MSZDP, but its political prestige slowly but steadily decreased. It
reached what was probably the peak of its power during the winter of
1918–1919, when the party (according to its own statistics) counted as
many as 1,5 million members.24 Up until the mid-1930s, the MSZDP
had the largest opposition faction in the parliament: it won 25 seats in
1922, 14 seats in 1926, and 11 in 1931; in the meantime, all the liberal
parties put together counted circa 10 seats. In the elections of 1922, in
which the democratic opposition won more votes than at any other
point during the interwar period, the MSZDP received over 300 thou-
sand votes (200 thousand in Budapest alone), while the liberals gained
100 thousand votes.25 In the early 1930s, when the democrats lost part
of their popularity, the MSZDP counted circa 50 thousand members,26
while the NDP and Rassay's party had only 25–30 thousand and 14–15
thousand members, respectively.27 With the decline of the left parties’
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popularity, by the early 1930s the right-wing Független Kisgazdapárt
(Independent Smallholders’ Party) became the main opposition force
inside Hungary. The new face of the parliamentary opposition – the
Smallholder leader Tibor Echkardt also inherited the label of a ‘bribed
Czech traitor’ from his adversaries.28
The alleged Czechoslovak financial assistance to the Hungar-
ian opposition was the main reason to call the democratic parties
‘Beneš or Little Entente agents,’29 but it seems that these parties pri-
marily sought to cover their expenses with donations made by their
members. Concurrently, they did not refuse outside aid when it was
offered. The liberals, for instance, could rely on financial aid from
Hungarian banks and trade and commercial associations (such as
ТÉВЕ, GYOSZ, and ОМКЕ), which were interested in lobbying the 
democrats' programme of regional economic cooperation. According
to the historian Zsuzsa Nagy, the Hungarian democrats could also
count on subsidies from the Rotary Club, the Fabian Society, the Pan-
European Movement, the Hungarian section of the League for Human
Rights (headed in Paris by Mihály Károlyi), and the freemasonry.30
The uprooted left-wing exiles were economically more vul-
nerable than their home fellows. Thus, the acquiring of stable revenue
became a major issue for their existence. ‘The Program for the Emi-
gration’ prepared by Oszkár Jászi in 1919, which called for the unity
of the anti-Horthyist leaders outside Hungary, stipulated that the émi-
gré community could accept the financial backing from foreign states
and private persons only with the assent of its all members.31 Never-
theless, the unification of leftist exile groups, not speaking about the
entire Hungarian democratic opposition, was never achieved and it
seems that their revenue streams remained unknown for each other.
The rumours that the Czechoslovaks were providing financial
support to the Hungarian opposition were not completely unfounded.
Sources indicate that the ČSR social-democrats assisted their Hungar-
ian comrades, and that the Prague government supported opposition
press both in exile (the Viennese Bécsi Magyar Újság and Új Ma-
gyarok)32 and inside Hungary (such as the Világ). The Czechs offered
loans and distribution on the territory of republic. In the early 1930s,
even the influential Budapest newspaper Pesti Napló approached
Beneš for a financial help needed to propagate Czech-Hungarian rec-
onciliation.33 Apart from the loans, the Hungarian opposition tried to
establish a more legal way of obtaining the financial help from Czech-
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Czechoslovakia. In 1921, the representatives of a ‘liberal block’ in
Hungary proposed the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry to grant their
commercial partners certain trading concessions.34 Ten years later, a
similar demand was formulated at Prague by another promoter of the
Czech-Hungarian rapprochement Gusztáv Gratz.35 Nevertheless, it
seems that the interwar right-wing speculations about the amount of
Czech subsidies for the Hungarian opposition were largely over-
estimated.
Prague and the Magyar democrats facing the counter-revolution
in Hungary, August 1919–December 1921.
Many interwar contacts between the political establishment of Prague
and the democratic forces of Budapest were rooted in the history of the
Dual Monarchy. Some relations originated from the pre-war social-
democratic networks, others were established in the halls of the Buda-
pest parliament, or originated from common schooling. What was
probably equally important is that during the First World War, the
Czech and Hungarian democratic opposition set up clandestine con-
nections with the Allies, hoping for outside assistance. The Czecho-
slovak National Council – instituted in 1916 in Paris by the émigrés, a
former Reichstag MP Professor Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk and his dis-
ciple Edvard Beneš – in the summer of 1918 received the Allies' rec-
ognition as the basis for a future Czechoslovak government. On 14
November 1918, Masaryk was elected president of the ČSR (to be re-
elected in 1920, 1927, and 1934), while Beneš became his irreplace-
able Foreign Minister (1918–1935). In turn, Count Mihály Károlyi –
leader of the Hungarian democratic opposition, who headed a Suffrage
block in 1917 that included the leaders of the Radical party (Oszkár
Jászi), Social Democrats (Manó Buchinger and Ernő Garami), and 
Vázsonyi from the NDP – also maintained secret contacts with the Al-
lies and openly called for a break between the Habsburg Monarchy
and Germany and for an immediate peace.36
In 1918, the Hungarian opposition tried to renew its liaisons
with the Czech left-wing politicians. In late October 1918, Buchinger
met with the influential Czech socialist Vlastimil Tusar in Vienna,
hoping to reach an agreement on future peaceful relations between
Prague and Budapest, both of which were on the verge of revolu-
tions.37 Following the victorious Aster Revolution in Budapest on 23–
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31 October 1918, led by Károlyi, and the establishment of a 'People's
Republic' in Hungary, Budapest exchanged official representatives
with Prague (where independence was proclaimed on 28 October). A
primary objective in building good relations with Czechoslovakia was
the need to obtain coal deliveries from the Silesian mines, and in No-
vember 1918, Buchinger arrived to Prague for ‘coal negotiations.’ As a
consequence, and under pressure from the Allies, Károlyi approved the
transfer of Slovakia to Czechoslovak administration in December
1918, thus creating conditions for further normalisation of Hungaro-
Czechoslovak relations. However, in March 1919 the Octobrist regime
in Budapest was replaced by Béla Kun's 'Soviet Republic'. Károlyi and
many of his adherents were removed from power and persecuted.
Prague's reaction to the creation of the Hungarian commune
was uncompromisingly negative: Czechoslovak troops moved into
Hungary and occupied the Subcarpathian Ruthenia. Next, Masaryk
suggested to Beneš to obtain approval of the Paris Peace Conference
for an occupation of Budapest by the Czechoslovak army. Old Hun-
garian elites opposed the communist regime too, and several counter-
revolutionary centres were created in Vienna and in the south-east of
Hungary, under the protection of South-Slav and French troops.
In summer 1919, Károlyi settled in the ČSR. There, he met 
regularly with Masaryk, Beneš, and Tusar (Prime Minister of the ČSR 
in 1919–1920), coordinating the activity of the Magyar democrats in
exile. Czech leaders assured Károlyi (as well as Oszkár Jászi – a fre-
quent visitor from Vienna) that the ČSR would support the creation of 
a democratic government in Hungary. Masaryk and Beneš repeatedly
stated that they would be ready to make territorial concessions to
'friendly' and 'non-reactionary' authorities in Budapest and restitute the
Magyar-populated Schütt Island (Žitný ostrov) in Slovakia to Hun-
gary.38 Prague's promises to assist the return of the émigrés to Buda-
pest tied the Octobrists’ hopes to Czechoslovak diplomatic successes.
On 1 August 1919, the Soviet government in Budapest was
replaced with a moderate socialist cabinet led by Gyula Peidl. Masaryk
immediately ordered Milan Hodža to go to Budapest as the ČSR repre-
sentative.39 However, on 6 August power passed into the hands of Ist-
ván Friedrich, who proclaimed his allegiance to József Habsburg. Ro-
mania, whose troops were occupying Budapest, took this de facto
Habsburg restoration calmly, but the authorities in Prague were dis-
concerted. Tusar, fearing a further monarchical consolidation in Hun-
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gary, kept trying to persuade the Hungarian envoy, Rezső Krejcsi, that 
a republican form of government had to be preserved in Hungary.40
Meanwhile, Beneš petitioned the Paris Peace Conference not to recog-
nize Friedrich's pro-Habsburg cabinet, instead advising to replace it
with a 'national democratic government'. In order to achieve that Beneš
was ready to provide troops.41
The Allies declined the offer of a Czech intervention of Buda-
pest but convinced Friedrich to disavow his loyalty to József Habsburg
and, on 15 August, assign the position of Foreign Minister to the Oc-
tobrist Márton Lovászi, who maintained close links with Garami,
Buchinger, Vázsonyi, and Hodža.42 As Hodža explained in his report
to Prague, the Lovászy group was a ‘lesser evil’ on the Hungarian po-
litical scene, which he wanted to support against Friedrich. Hodža
even suggested to the Inter-Allied Military Mission that had arrived to
Budapest to appoint Lovászy the Prime Minister instead of Friedrich.43
What was probably most important is that in Hodža’s words ‘Lovászy
and Garami showed their will to recognize immediately the new fron-
tiers already established by the peace conference.’44 On 11 September
1919, Friedrich dismissed Lovászi,45 but Czechoslovak diplomacy still
hoped that he may be brought back to power. On 30 September, Hodža
reported to Prague that he ‘urged Lovászi’s group to action.’46
Prague was not ready to relinquish its plan to change the situa-
tion in Budapest in its favour. On 13 October 1919, Beneš assured
Jászi that the ČSR would not allow a de jure recognition of Friedrich's
cabinet and, 'if necessary', would even to launch a military expedition
against him. At the same time, Beneš admitted that Miklós Horthy,
who could rely on his own army, was even more dangerous than Frie-
drich. As an alternative to Friedrich and Horthy with their revanchist
intentions, Jászi proposed his own concept of Danubian cooperation,
which was supposed to unite Hungarians, Czechs, Austrians, and Yu-
goslavs, allowing for a development of economy and democracy in the
region (although under the Czech leadership).47 A couple of days later
Beneš informed the Paris Peace Conference that Hungarian politicians
had managed to draw up a plan of instituting a multi-party government
in Budapest (consisting of democrats, socialists, and agrarians), which
would function under the protection of Romanian and Czechoslovak
troops. This shadow government intended to dissolve Horthy's army,
sign a peace treaty with the Allies in the name of Hungary, and create
an economic bloc with the ČSR, Yugoslavia, and Austria.48
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Participants of the Paris Peace Conference approved of the
idea of a coalition cabinet in Hungary, but decided to supervise di-
rectly its creation. In October–November 1919, the Entente sent the
British diplomat Sir George Clerk (recently appointed as the first Brit-
ish envoy in Prague). However, Clerk did not focus on bringing back
the Octobrists to power, but only on assuring the participation of the
social-democrats in a new multi-party government in Budapest. The
democratic forces perceived the Clerk mission and the issue of recon-
ciliation with the counter-revolutionaries without much hope, but the
opinions whether to join a new government or not were divided. For
instance, inside MSZDP, Garami opposed it, but another party leader,
Károly Peyer, supported it. By the end of November, Clerk managed
to obtain the resignation of Friedrich's cabinet, withdrawal of the Ro-
manian troops, and the formation of a coalition government, which
was dominated by counter-revolutionaries but also included members
of the MSZDP (Peyer) and the NDP. The new cabinet, led by Károly
Huszár, was de facto recognized by the Allies and invited to the peace
conference. Even though the social democrats had joined the govern-
ment, they were loosing their positions under the ‘white terror’ perse-
cutions. On 17 December, Hodža, reporting to Prague, wrote that the
MSZDP would not be a powerful factor any more, but he added that a
delegation of Hungarian republicans was preparing to leave for Pra-
gue.49 At the same time, Garami, who had escaped to Vienna, was
convincing the Czechoslovak representative Flieder that the left and
right wings’ reconciliation in Budapest would prove to be short-lived.
Assuring that the MSZDP would soon pull out of the government,
Garami entreated the ČSR not to establish economic relations with 
Hungary until its citizens were guaranteed democratic rights.50 Garami
turned out to be right: as Horthy’s ‘white terror’ continued, Peyer left
the government in January 1920, and the MSZDP announced that it
would boycott the upcoming parliamentary elections.
In the beginning of 1920, and especially after the new Hungar-
ian parliament officially reinstituted the monarchy and elected Miklós
Horthy regent on 1 March, the Budapest authorities intensified their
action aimed to retake Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia by force.
Their chosen methods included encouraging the Magyar irredentists,
playing on Slovak separatism, and wooing the Allies. Budapest's re-
vanchist plans created fertile conditions for the intensification of rela-
tions between the leftist émigrés and Prague. During a meeting with an
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Octobrist delegation on 31 March 1920, Beneš expressed his approval
of Károlyi’s plan to unite all the exiles and bring down the Horthy re-
gime. Next, Károlyi planned to restore the republic, carry out internal
agrarian and social reforms, and develop stronger ties with neighbour-
ing countries. Beneš agreed to grant semi-official recognition to the
Magyar émigrés and promised to provide asylum in the ČSR to other 
Hungarians if necessary. According to the Czech Minister, the most
efficient way to exert pressure on Horthy would be an open rebellion;
however, Beneš recommended postponing the operation until after the
signing of a peace treaty with the Allies, in order to make sure that
Czechoslovakia would not be accused of breaking the armistice
terms.51 This honeymoon period between the Prague Castle (Hrad) and
the Octobrists lasted until the summer of 1920. In the meantime, Ma-
saryk and Beneš continued to assure the Hungarian émigrés that an
armed intervention against the counter-revolution in Hungary was pos-
sible;52 however, both Prague and Budapest eventually refrained from
such military escapades.
Once the Trianon Peace Treaty was signed on 4 June 1920 be-
tween Hungary and the Allies, including the ČSR, exiles realised that 
Prague began to view Budapest in a different light. Now Beneš aimed
at a normalisation of official Hungaro-Czechoslovak relations. On 7
June Masaryk made it clear to Jászi that although his sympathies re-
mained unchanged, he did not consider an active intervention against
the Horthy regime any more. The disappointed Károlyi, in turn, began
planning to diversify the émigrés' international connections: he wanted
them to collaborate not only with Prague, but also with Belgrade
(which, in Károlyi's opinion, could help arm the ‘anti-government’
against Horthy), as well as with the British Labour Party (which had
initiated an international investigation of the 'white terror' crimes and
of the subsequent boycott of Hungary by the Austrian transport enter-
prises in summer 1920) and, if possible, with Moscow and with the
Slovak communists.53 Nevertheless, Jászi still hoped that Czechoslo-
vakia would remain a stronghold of the Magyar émigrés.
Tensions between the Octobrists and the authorities in Prague
kept rising. The autumn of 1920 saw the dissolution of the Hungarian
émigré chancellery in Prague. Jászi, who continued meeting with
Czechoslovak diplomats on a monthly and even weekly basis, criti-
cised the 'Czech passivity' and proposed – without success – to create a
series of Hungarian paramilitary units in South Slovakia.54 After yet
another audience in the Hrad in September 1920, Jászi concluded that
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Beneš would not act against Horthy without the support of the Western
Great Powers.55 Another Czech blow to the Magyar exiles came in
December 1920, when the Czechoslovak authorities banned the distri-
bution of the leading exile newspaper Bécsi Magyar Újság (‘Vienna
Magyar Newspaper’) in Slovakia, where most of its readers resided.56
The symptoms of cooling in relations between Prague and the
Magyar exiles were signs of a new trend in the Czech foreign policy.
Beneš seemed to expect that the growing volume of trade between
Hungary and Czechoslovakia would eventually induce the Horthy re-
gime to cease its irredentist propaganda in Slovakia, demilitarise the
country, and definitely relinquish the idea of a Habsburg restoration.
Further, Beneš hoped that a place could be found for Budapest within
the framework of Prague's policy in Central Europe. The Czechoslo-
vak statesman even tried to persuade the Hungarian government to
restore the republican form of government in Hungary.57 When Prague
set its priority on developing relations with Budapest, Hungarian émi-
grés suffered the loss of an important foreign protector. As this policy
was introduced in autumn 1920, Károlyi left the ČSR; and after the 
first bilateral Czechoslovak-Hungarian talks in Austria’s Bruck on 14–
15 March 1921, where Beneš personally met with Prime Minister Pál
Teleki and his Foreign Minister, Gusztáv Gratz, desperate Jászi wrote
to Károlyi, 'we have never felt so crushed'.58
Very soon the newly achieved reconciliation between Prague
and Budapest seemed to falter: in March 1921, Teleki and Gratz com-
promised themselves when the (ex-) King Charles IV Habsburg tried
to retake power in Hungary. Beneš replied with a threat of an interven-
tion, and Charles IV chose to leave the country on his own accord. As
the Czechoslovak Minister to Vienna, Flieder, noted, Magyar émigrés
cheerfully welcomed the Czech’s anti-Habsburg stand, losing their
fears that Prague turned back to the democratic values in foreign pol-
icy.59
Smooth Budapest-Prague relations, however, were soon re-
stored. Teleki and Gratz resigned, and István Bethlen, who had been
appointed Prime Minister in April 1921, continued the policy of rap-
prochement with Prague. In general, Bethlen's decision to give up both
the irredentist propaganda and calls for a revision of the Treaty of Tri-
anon (at least temporarily) became the basis of the Hungarian policy of
good neighbour relations on the Danube.
The émigrés' hopes for a triumphant return to Budapest were
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momentarily rekindled in October 1921, when Charles IV undertook a
second attempt to take back the throne. In reaction to this new restora-
tion putsch, Beneš – who acted as both Prime Minister and Foreign
Minister in 1921–1922 – began a mobilization and warned Bethlen
that unless the Hungarian government dealt with the Habsburg claims,
the Czechoslovak army would. The Magyar exiles decided to use the
pressure exerted by the ČSR as a tool to bring down the counter-
revolutionary regime. Jászi and Garami urgently left Vienna for Pra-
gue. On 28 October, Beneš met with Jászi and explained that the ex-
iles' plan to remove Horthy would be difficult to realise due to the po-
sition taken by the Allies (who wanted Bethlen and Horthy to deal
with Charles without any outside interference). To Jászi's disappoint-
ment, Horthy’s army defeated the Habsburg troops and took the king
prisoner.60
The aggressive Czech reaction to the Habsburg putsch, as well
as the exiles' concurrent visit to Prague, led the Hungarian authorities
to wonder if Beneš was harbouring imperialist plans.61 On 29 October
1921, the Hungarian envoy in the ČSR, László Tahy, pointedly asked 
the ČSR Foreign Ministry officials if Prague intended to force an émi-
gré republican government on Hungary and create a 'Slavic corridor'
leading into Yugoslavia.62 Beneš denied this; he also informed the au-
thorities in London (with whom the Hungarian government had shared
their concerns) that any allegations that Prague wanted to institute an
émigré government in Budapest were false.63
Even though in practice Beneš took the side of Horthy in the
Habsburg putsch, some Magyar democrats remained convinced that
Prague's sympathies still lay with them. Right before the planned de-
thronement of the Habsburgs in Hungary (scheduled for 6 November
1921), the chargé d’affaires of the Czechoslovak mission in Budapest,
Karel Feistmantel, telegraphed to Prague that Horthy had resigned and
the opposition was ready to form a new cabinet with Count János Had-
ik (a liberal legitimist who had been designated Prime Minister during
the heady days of the Aster Revolution of 1918) as Prime Minister.
The position of Minister of Foreign Affairs in this scheme would have
gone to Garami.64 Even though the Regent's resignation turned out to
be a hoax, the shadow cabinet formed by the legitimist Hadik and the
socialist Garami proved to be long-lasting: the idea of replacing the
Horthy-Bethlen tandem with that of Hadik and Garami kept resurfac-
ing during the consequent political crises of 1926 and 1931.
In the early 1920s, many Hungarian exiles left the ČSR, while 
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the anti-Horthyist opposition found refuge mainly in Austria. In late
1921, Beneš instructed the new Czechoslovak envoy to Austria, Kamil
Krofta, to keep away from the 'dreamers' among the Magyar émigrés.65
Thus it is not surprising that when Krofta held his first meeting with
the leftist Hungarian politicians on 9 February 1922 in Vienna, Jászi
was left with the impression that the new envoy was less cordial than
his predecessor, Robert Flieder.66 It became ever clearer to the Octo-
brists that Prague preferred to reach reconciliation with the authorities
in Budapest rather than help the Hungarian exiles return home.67 Even
Krofta could not deny this: he admitted to Jászi that although the Hrad
was sympathetic to the Hungarian oppositionists, Prague had to con-
sider Horthy's significant political weight.68 On 18 March 1922, Krofta
informed Jászi that Beneš felt disappointed with the Octobrists exiles.
The Czechoslovak Prime Minister was displeased that the predictions
of Horthy's fall did not materialise and suspected that if the Hungarian
émigrés were allowed to return to power, they would pursue a revan-
chist foreign policy.69
Bethlen's consolidation policy and the marginalisation of the anti-
Horthyist opposition (1921–1930)
While curbing their ties with the émigrés, the Prague authorities
sought not only to normalise relations with Budapest, but also to find
leverage points among the opposition movements within Hungary.
Throughout the 1920s, the MSZDP (which possessed large cells in
Hungary and abroad) became Prague's privileged partner on the Hun-
garian political scene, with socialist exiles frequently acting as inter-
mediaries. In summer 1921, Garami – one of the leaders of the émigré
wing of the MSZDP – helped Beneš to establish a rapport of trust with
the so-called ‘liberal bloc’ in Budapest, which united assorted groups
of anti-Horthyist socialists, radicals, industrialists, Catholics, Evan-
gelicals, and freemasons. This new democratic front included both re-
publicans and monarchists. The members of the new bloc hoped to
obtain financial aid from the ČSR in order to pursue their political ac-
tivities and publish their newspapers.70
It soon became clear that the plan to form a fronde in Hungary
with Prague's assistance had serious faults. Horthyist agents provo-
cateurs succeeded in getting several leaders of the liberal bloc (such as
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Ádám Persián) arrested in summer 1921.71 Taking into account the
danger of further persecutions by the counter-revolutionary authorities,
the opposition in Budapest chose to put their contacts with the ČSR on 
hold.72
In late 1921, the home branch of the MSZDP – led by Károly
Peyer, who had recently returned from exile – opted for a compromise
with Horthy’s regime. Once the so-called Bethlen-Peyer Pact was
signed on 21 December 1921, the party was finally legalised. The
MSZDP pledged to act in accordance with the kingdom's laws and
limit its propaganda and calls to strikes. The social democrats also
vowed to cut their ties with the émigrés and spread Hungary-friendly
propaganda abroad.73
Nevertheless, the MSZDP continued cooperating with its for-
eign fellows, using them as intermediaries in its contacts with the
ČSR. On the eve of the parliamentary elections in Hungary, which 
were to take place in May–June 1922, Garami, Vázsonyi, and Rassay
began talks on the creation of a new democratic coalition. The atmos-
phere before the elections was tense, and the electoral campaign was
accompanied by attacks against members of the opposition. The inac-
tion of the Budapest legal enforcement even gave rise to the joke that
the evidence 'was intent on discovering the police'.74 Rassay repeatedly
came to Vienna to meet with Garami and various Czechoslovak politi-
cians. Prague's connections to the opposition in Budapest caused sev-
eral scandals that almost led to a severing of diplomatic relations be-
tween Hungary and the ČSR. On 11 June 1922, Bécsi Magyar Újság
published an interview with Beneš, in which he professed the ČSR's 
moral support for Hungarian democracy and the work done by the
Hungarian émigrés. Beneš insisted that the émigrés needed to return to
Hungary and prepare the country for reforms from the inside.75 Buda-
pest protested against this statement and threatened to cut off diplo-
matic relations with Prague. Beneš disavowed his interview, and the
incident was resolved.76
The 1922 elections resulted in success for the social democ-
rats: the MSZDP came in second after Bethlen's Unified Party in terms
of the number of votes. Bethlen's party gained only twice as many
votes as the MSZDP, it received 143 seats in the parliament, while the
socialists got only 25. Considering the circumstances of the electoral
campaign, the democratic and legitimist opposition leaders refused to
recognize the legitimacy of the new parliament. In autumn the MPs
from the MSZDP, the NDP, and Rassay's party created their own par-
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liamentary faction – the Civic and Workers Union, which included
circa 50 MPs.77
Beneš did not hide his satisfaction with the successes of the
opposition in Hungary. On 12 July 1922, he once again assured Jászi
of his continued support of the exiles and even recommended the es-
tablishment of a new émigré representation in Prague. Beneš also
promised to investigate the assassinations during the electoral cam-
paign and to work on expanding the suffrage in Hungary.78 Meanwhile
Czechoslovak involvement in the 1922 parliamentary elections at-
tracted wide public attention. The radical nationalists in Budapest sus-
pected that the democrats had received funding from the ČSR and 
called them traitors,79 while the Foreign Office procured confidential
information that Prague had provided the MSZDP with a loan of 3 mil-
lion Czechoslovak korunas for their electoral campaign. According to
another British source, Beneš had promised the Hungarian leadership
that if a social-democratic government were to be formed in Budapest,
the ČSR would be prepared to make territorial concessions to Hun-
gary.80 It seems that this kind of offer was made by the Hrad more than
once.
Those democratic leaders who had not returned to Hungary
used every opportunity to exert pressure on Horthy’s regime with the
help of their international collaborators. In 1923–1924, Bethlen's cabi-
net found itself in great difficulty as a consequence of the post-war
economic crisis. As the government desperately tried to obtain a relief
from its burden of reparation payments (mostly by means of an inter-
national loan under the aegis of the League of Nations), the anti-
Horthyists turned to private diplomacy. In April 1923, Károlyi, Jászi,
and Béla Linder suggested to the Yugoslav authorities that the Little
Entente members should approve a loan for Hungary only if Budapest
agreed to carry out democratic reforms.81 At first the opposition had
great hopes for the Little Entente: when in September 1923 Bethlen
held several meetings with Beneš in Geneva to discuss the terms of the
international loan, rumours spread among the Budapest liberals that
Beneš was going to demand the creation of a reconciliation cabinet,
which would include members of the leftist opposition.82
Beneš' report to the parliament in early November 1923, in
which he mentioned the issue of the Magyar émigrés, elicited a lively
reaction in Hungary. According to the account sent to Prague by the
Czechoslovak envoy in Budapest, Hugo Vavrečka, the Magyar émi-
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grés and their supporters at home were elated, believing that Beneš
would not agree to a loan unless the exiles were allowed to return.
Radicals on the right, by contrast, were offended, convinced that Beth-
len was ready to tolerate interference in Hungary's internal affairs just
to get the loan. They insisted that in return Prague needed to agree to a
repatriation of Slovakia’s refugees, of whom there were 150 thousand
in Hungary. Vavrečka added that Bethlen's own reaction to Beneš' 
speech was remarkably calm. Prime Minister assured the public that he
had not made any promises in Geneva regarding internal policy or the
émigrés' return, and that Beneš had not even made such demands. At
the same time, while speaking with Vavrečka in private, Bethlen noted 
that some exiles could safely return to the country.83
The issue of the Magyar emigration was indeed raised during
the Czechoslovak-Hungarian negotiations in 1923. However, just as
before, Prague was leaning towards a compromise in return for politi-
cal concessions. The talks between Bethlen and Beneš in Geneva took
place largely thanks to the assurances given by one of Bethlen's close
associates, a banker Filip Weiss. Weiss told to the ČSR Legation 
Counselor in Budapest, Jaroslav Novák that Prague had to cease its
support of the MSZDP – which had no chance of obtaining power in
the country anyway. In contrast, Weiss advised to start supporting
Bethlen instead, who allegedly acted in full accordance with the Treaty
of Trianon, kept the Hungarian army numbers low, and was prepared
to curb the influence of Gömbös and his racist followers. In his report
to Prague, Novak agreed that it would be worth helping Bethlen if
such was indeed his policy and wrote in his report, 'Hungary is so soft
now that you can mould it as you wish'.84 In August 1923, as the tech-
nical details of the Hungaro-Czechoslovak negotiations were being
settled, Gömbös left the Unified Party and moved into open opposition
to the government.85
Bethlen and Beneš began discussing the issue of repatriation
of the Magyar exiles at their very first meeting on 6 September 1923 in
Geneva. According to Beneš, the return of the leftist émigrés to Hun-
gary would make it easier for Prague to agree to a loan for Hungary,
since the Czechoslovak socialists maintained strong ties with the ex-
iles.86 Bethlen took a few days to consider the matter and finally re-
plied to Beneš on 9 September that he could not approve an amnesty
for the émigrés without them first being tried in court. Still, Bethlen
offered an alternative solution: if Hungary was to put a stop to irreden-
tist propaganda, then the neighbouring states – including the ČSR – 
Hungarian Democrats and the Czechoslovak Authorities
1919-32
41
would need to limit the émigrés’ propaganda against the Hungarian
government. Beneš agreed and guaranteed that the Czechoslovak gov-
ernment would take measures against the Magyar exiles as soon as
friendly relations were established between Budapest and Prague.87
The democratic opposition's hopes that the matter of the inter-
national loan would weaken the Horthy regime did not materialise: the
negotiations were proceeding successfully without any significant sof-
tening to the counter-revolutionary regime. After the Bethlen-Beneš
talks in Geneva, Krofta explained to Jászi that 'we had to reach an
agreement with Bethlen, because that is what the Allies and the
League of Nations wanted.’88 In spite of such statements, the émigrés
felt that Beneš had ‘allied’ with Bethlen and that 'the Little Entente
seemed more eager to deal with Horthy than with the Magyar democ-
rats'.89 Although as late as January 1924 Károlyi was still convinced
that 'with French help, Beneš managed to postpone the matter (the loan
– A.P.) indefinitely',90 he subsequently changed his view. Thirty years
later, Károlyi wrote in his memoirs that Beneš did not protest against
issuing a loan to Budapest, which presumably proved that Prague was
not truly opposed to Horthy's regime.91
However, when the UK Labour Party (which had led the in-
ternational campaign against the 'white terror' in Hungary in 1920)
formed the cabinet in January 1924, the Hungarian dissidents were
once again filled with hope: perhaps the proposed international loan
could still be used as a way to bring down the counter-revolutionary
regime. On 1 February, the influential socialist Gyula Peidl told the
official Czechoslovak newspaper Prager Presse that he was planning
to hold talks with Ramsay MacDonald's cabinet about reversing the
counter-revolution and allowing the exiles to return.92 Thanks to me-
diation by Czechoslovak diplomats, a Hungarian leftist delegation
soon arrived in London (Garami and Peidl from the MSZDP, and
Rusztem Vámbéry from the Kossuth Party). The democrats insisted on
the need to restore universal secret suffrage in Hungary, revoke the
Numerus Clausus Act that limited the admission of Jews to universi-
ties, and ensure civic liberties.93 Károlyi and Jászi made similar sug-
gestions to MacDonald in the summer of 1924. Nonetheless, the
wishes of both delegations were largely ignored.94
On 14 March 1924, Hungary and the Little Entente members
signed two protocols in Geneva, confirming their acceptance of the
Trianon terms, pledging to respect their mutual sovereignty and territo-
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rial integrity and not to interfere in each other's internal affairs. Based
on these agreements, the Little Entente states agreed to an international
loan of 250 million gold korunas for Hungary; Budapest received the
first installment in summer 1924. Although Bethlen reassured the
Hungarian parliament that the terms of the loan did not contain any
internal policy stipulations, he still unexpectedly promised democratic
reforms.95 Soon the Horthyist internment camps were dissolved, and
the 'least important criminals' among the exiles were allowed to return
and granted an amnesty.96 Nevertheless, this limited democratisation
could not satisfy the leftist and liberal circles, which started to regret
counting not only on Prague, but also on London. After the anti-
Horthyist oppositionists found themselves unable to gain reliable sup-
port over the course of the loan negotiations either in Czechoslovakia
or in Labour-led Britain, they focused their hopes on France.97
A great opportunity to test the opposition's pro-French orienta-
tion came in 1926, when it was uncovered that several of the top Hor-
thyist officials were involved in counterfeiting French francs and
Czechoslovak korunas.98 The ČSR tried to blow out of proportion the 
'counterfeiters affair' in the media and at various political forums. In
June 1926, Beneš admitted to his Czech colleagues that he considered
the talks that followed the discovery of the counterfeiting operation a
political success.99 Indeed, Bethlen almost resigned under the burden
of evidence.100 As reported to Budapest by the Hungarian envoy in
Paris, Baron Frigyes Korányi, 'the Little Entente, the Second Interna-
tional, and the League for Human Rights, together with certain interna-
tional Jewish circles, are doing their best to discredit the current re-
gime in the eyes of the whole world and to install a Károlyi-style re-
public in Hungary.'101
In January 1926, Garami arrived in Paris together with another
important MSZDP member, József Diner-Dénes. During their visit to
the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs, both politicians tried to persuade
the Quai d'Orsay officials to take harsh measures against Budapest in
order to bring a new, 'unstained' government into power. This new
cabinet, as they saw it, had to be led by János Hadik, who had already
been suggested for the role in 1921. According to Garami and Diner-
Dénes, Hadik's cabinet, although composed of legitimists, would im-
mediately introduce a universal secret ballot. Furthermore, the gov-
ernment of Hadik would include proponents of a reconciliation with
the Czechs and the Serbs. Diner-Dénes added that since Beneš had a
good grasp of Hungarian internal policy, the ČSR could be very useful 
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in putting pressure on the Horthy regime.102 However, the intrigues of
the Magyar émigrés did not lead to Bethlen's resignation. In August
1926 Garami, distraught by this new failure, informed the Hungarian
envoy in Paris of his desire to return to Budapest and participate in the
work of the parliament.103 The December 1926 elections in Hungary
proved that the influence of the democratic opposition had diminished:
their number of seats fell, while that of the Unified Party rose to
170.104
The period 1926–1928 saw a significant improvement in the
international standing of Horthy’s regime. After the League of Nations
lifted the financial and military restrictions imposed on Hungary, Bu-
dapest signed friendship treaties with Rome, Ankara, Warsaw, and
Sofia and launched a so-called ‘active diplomacy’. Bethlen managed to
ameliorate his relations not only with Great Britain, but also with
France and even the ČSR. The strengthening of Horthy’s regime 
pushed the émigrés to change their tactics. Garami and Buchinger –
the leaders of the international branch of the MSZDP – sent out feelers
to Budapest, hoping to arrange a compromise for the exiles’ return to
Hungary. This initiative was apparently supported by the ČSR. In reac-
tion to the new position of the MSZDP, which had started to insist
more actively on a revision of the Trianon peace terms, the influential
Czech newspaper Národní politika wrote on 8 August 1929 that Pra-
gue's leftist sympathies remained unchanged: 'It is in our best interest
to have Garami or Jászi rule in Hungary instead of Bethlen'.105 Beth-
len's government seriously considered the international potential of the
MSZDP and in September 1929 decided to lift criminal charges
against important social democrats.106 As a result, the ten-year exile of
several leading members of the MSZDP finally came to an end: in No-
vember 1929, Garami and Buchinger safely returned to Hungary. As a
proof of the new relationship format between the government and its
opponents, Bethlen temporarily recognized the need for a 'democrati-
sation' and agreed to local elections based on a secret ballot.107 At the
same time, as the Hungarian democratic core abroad melted away,
Horthy’s regime reached the peak of its stability.
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The economic crisis and the renaissance of secret collaboration
between the Hungarian opposition and Czechoslovakia (1930–32)
Several months after the Wall Street crash of October 1929, the global
recession reached Europe. The Great Depression disrupted interna-
tional trade and finance and threatened not only to ruin the shaky Hun-
garian economy, but to undermine the power of the Horthy-Bethlen
tandem. Conscious of the scale of the upcoming stagnation, Jászi (who
had been living in the U.S. since 1924) wrote to Vámbéry on 12 No-
vember 1929, 'the Hungarian counter-revolution may turn into chaos...
The October programme is more timely today than it was in 1918.'108
Jászi's forecast was quite correct. As the prices for agricultural
produce (which constituted the main Hungarian export) fell rapidly
and foreign investment dried up, the Horthyist economy found itself in
deep crisis. This was a perfect moment for a new mobilisation of the
democratic opposition. In 1930, the social democrats annulled one of
the compromise points of the 1921 Bethlen-Peyer Pact, which prohib-
ited public protests, and organised one of the largest manifestations of
the interwar period: on 1 September 1930, circa 100 thousand people
gathered in protest on the streets of Budapest.109 After the demontra-
tion, Bethlen became convinced that the ČSR had been instigating the 
opposition against Horthy's regime.110 The Hungarian envoy in Prague,
Szilárd Masirevich, also concluded that Beneš – contrary to his pro-
claimed desire for a rapprochement with Hungary – was secretly plot-
ting to 'hang a so-called democratic government around our neck'.111
The Hungarian authorities suspected that Czechoslovakia's main ob-
jective was to suppress the revisionist campaign in Hungary and to
‘democratise’ Horthy’s regime.112 In the spring of 1931, international
newspapers reported that Beneš had expressed a desire to see a more
'accommodating government' in Budapest – one that would not press
for a revision of the Treaty of Trianon but rather endorse Garami's po-
sition on the future of the Hungaro-Czechoslovak relations.113
Whilst Hungary’s economy managed to endure the Great De-
pression with difficulties, Prague did not miss the opportunity to apply
pressure to the beleaguered counter-revolutionary regime. In June of
1930, the ČSR announced its intention to terminate the trade agree-
ment in Hungary; this gave rise to a customs war between the two
states, which began in 1931 and lasted for five years,114 catastrophi-
cally damaging the Hungarian economy. Moreover, Prague expanded
its connections on the Hungarian political scene. The Czechoslovak
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envoy in Budapest, Václav Pallier, named among open promoters of
Hungaro-Czechoslovak reconciliation the social democrats, the liberal
democrats, some legitimists (especially ex-Prime Minister István Frie-
drich and ex-Foreign Minister Gusztáv Gratz) and an economist Ele-
mér Hantos.115
Unable to reckon with the economic crisis in Hungary, István
Bethlen resigned on 19 August 1931. Bethlen's resignation was met
with jubilation in the Czechoslovak press: almost all newspapers wrote
that the only way Horthy’s regime could deal with the crisis was to
introduce a democratic form of government and reconcile with neigh-
bouring countries.116 The new Prime Minister Count Gyula Károlyi
was more amenable to a rapprochement with the ČSR, and even listed 
it as one of his foreign priorities in his first speech in the parliament.117
Károlyi hurriedly engaged into broad-scale diplomatic exchanges with
the Czechs.118
The economic hardships (budgetary cuts, failing earnings, and
growing unemployment) undermined the Horthyist stabilisation. The
opposition political parties recruited masses of new members. The
widest popularity was enjoyed not by the MSZDP but the Independent
Smallholder’s Party, which reportedly had 500 thousand followers.119
Fearing the explosion of public discontent, a state of emergency was
declared in September 1931 in the country. This measure did not pre-
clude the spread of the idea of the overthrow the Horthy regime by
force if necessary. Most often calls for the use of weapons were heard
from the nationalists and the Smallholders.120
The Hungarian socialists and the legitimists also intensified
their activity, but did not plan to overthrow Horthy through an armed
insurrection. First of all, they strove to create a united front that would
be able to push through democratic reforms.121 Additionally both the
legitimists and the MSZDP demanded the government in Budapest to
initiate a rapprochement with the ČSR.122 One of the first coordinated
actions carried out by the new democratic anti-Horthyist front was to
organise an international congress on Danubian cooperation in Buda-
pest. The goal of the congress was to popularise the idea of removing
the high customs barriers that existed between the smaller states in the
Central Europe and to bring them closer together politically. Czecho-
slovak envoy Pallier was approached with the idea for such an event
by representatives of the Kossuth Party Pál Auer and Vámbéry in late
November 1931.123 The conference – which took place in Budapest on
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11–12 February 1932 under the auspices of the Pan-European Move-
ment – was attended by delegates from Austria, Hungary, Czechoslo-
vakia, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Poland.124
Throughout the winter of 1931–1932, the social democrats
Garami and Buchinger, as well as the legitimists Gratz, Friedrich, and
an economist Hantos made numerous trips to the ČSR.125 While Gratz,
together with Hantos, became the most visible propagandists of the
economic cooperation among the Danube nations (especially among
Hungary, Austria and Czechoslovakia), their first discussions with
Beneš did not bear fruit. On 19 September 1931 in Geneva, Hantos
handed to Beneš, Krofta and the French diplomat André François-
Poncet a memorandum with a plan of economic rapprochement be-
tween Hungary, Austria, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Hantos as-
sured his interlocutors that he acted in accordance with the influential
Defence Minister, General Gyula Gömbös. As Hantos explained, the
general, in case he would be appointed Prime Minister, would proceed
to the creation of a ‘democratic parliament’ in Budapest (but only if
the regional trade will be restored and the Czechoslovak-Hungarian
frontier will be modified).126 However, even though Hantos’ pro-
nouncements were positively covered by almost all Czech newspa-
pers,127 he failed to gain much confidence in Prague. One member of
the Czechoslovak intelligence service described him as a clever ‘po-
litical opportunist’ who did not have substantial backing in Hun-
gary.128
What was probably more important is that the general Göm-
bös, a well-known chauvinist, could hardly inspire the Czechoslovaks
as a negotiating partner. However, as Gömbös’ position was reinforced
by the resignation of Bethlen, the prospects of collaborating with him
needed examination. In 1931, the Czechoslovak government learned
with satisfaction that Gömbös consented to the reduction of the gov-
ernmental financial aid to the Magyar parties in Slovakia and even
prompted the dismissal of its leaders (such as OKSZP President Géza
Szüllő).129 Moreover, Gömbös, like Beneš, was an ardent opponent of
the Habsburg restoration and, apparently considered the economic co-
operation among Hungary, Austria and Czechoslovakia as ‘natural’.130
When Gratz went to see Beneš in Prague on 12 December
1931 (following a trip to Paris), the results of discussion were limited.
The Czech leader rejected the project of the Upper Danube ‘triangle’
of Vienna-Budapest-Prague, stating that he preferred the rapproche-
ment that included the five regional states: the Little Entente members
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plus Austria and Hungary. Once such a union is realised, Beneš said,
the revision of Hungary’s frontiers could be discussed.131
In the meantime, Prague maintained more cordial relations
with its old left-wing partners. Among their exchanges, the case re-
corded in most detail is that of Garami visit to Prague in early Decem-
ber 1931, followed by one to Paris. The central topic of his talks with
Beneš was a plan of democratisation of Horthy’s regime. Garami
hoped – just like he did in 1926 – that with French and Czechoslovak
help he would be able to force Horthy to approve a transitional gov-
ernment, which was to be led by Hadik. János Hadik had pledged that
if he was appointed Prime Minister, he would reform the counter-
revolutionary regime and build stronger economic and political ties
with the ČSR. Beneš approved of the plan. Garami also reassured him 
that the new government would dissolve paramilitary organisations
and pursue a demilitarisation of Hungary. However, in order to make
this 'peaceful revolution' a reality (Garami insisted that Horthy would
not leave 'without spilling blood', so he 'had to stay'), Hadik's cabinet
would require the funds necessary to lift Hungary out of the financial
crisis.132 On 21 December 1931, Garami, accompanied and the French
socialist Léon Blum, were received by Prime Minister Aristide Briand
who promised he would take the same position towards the Garami-
Hadik plan as Beneš.133
The conspiratorial activities of the Hungarian opposition and
their relations with the Czechoslovak Republic did not go unnoticed by
the Budapest government. On 4 February 1932, Gyula Károlyi said in
Parliament that he had no objections to the foreign travels of Friedrich
and Gratz, but did not support them.134 Nevertheless in practice, while
the foreign activities of Gratz were indeed tolerated, the Friedrich au-
dience with Beneš cooled dawn the Czechophile sentiments in the Uni-
fied Party circles.135 As one party member confessed to the Czechs
later that Friedrich's meeting with Beneš might be compared with the
potential reception in Budapest of the Czechoslovak general Radola
Gajda,136 who was accused in 1931 of preparing a putsch.
By spring 1932 it had became clear that most of the initiatives
that had been proposed by the advocates of democratisation in Hun-
gary had failed: both the Danubian integration project and that of a
transitional government of Hadik were not realised. Although Prague
maintained its contacts with the MSZDP and the legitimists, the recent
reconciliation between the left and right branches of the anti-Horthyist
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opposition was bursting at its seams. In order to clarify the situation in
Hungary, the Czech journalist Hubert Ripka – a trusted associate of the
Hrad – made a visit to Budapest from 30 April–2 May 1932. He met
with both dissident politicians and members of the Unified Party. In
his report Ripka concluded that 'the militant spirit of the opposition has
dwindled' and that a fall of the regime seemed unlikely. 'A revolution-
ary coup is hardly imaginable', stated Ripka, adding that the Hungarian
frondeurs placed excessive hopes in Beneš.137
It seems that Prague abstained from further involvement into
the struggle among different political groups in Hungary. Perhaps
Hrad leaders viewed their old left-wing partners too weak, perhaps the
personality of right-wing leaders aroused distrust. In any case, accord-
ing to Hungarian Foreign Ministry data, the ČSR began to cut its fi-
nancial aid to the 'parasitic Magyar exiles' starting in May 1932, while
visits of non-governmental Hungarian politicians to Prague became
ever more rare.138 It looks quite credible that Prague once again pre-
ferred to come in terms with the official Budapest, scarifying the inter-
ests of the Hungarian democrats.
It could be speculated that the two governments – in Prague
and Budapest – simultaneously agreed to cut their contacts with the
opposition movements across their common frontier. Not only did
Beneš refrain from further interference into Hungarian politics but also
the Károlyi cabinet calmed down the Magyar opposition in Slova-
kia.139
Contemporaneously with the diminution of assistance of each
other’s opposition circles, Hungary and ČSR were steadily improving 
their economic relations. A symptom of this was the fact that the ČSR 
and Hungary signed a compensation trade agreement.140 On 23 Au-
gust, giving a press conference, Prime Minister Károlyi presumptu-
ously predicted that this freshly signed agreement ‘broke the ice’ be-
tween Hungary and Czechoslovakia and constituted a first step to-
wards restoring the normal trade relations between them.141 Neverthe-
less, the ice was not broken on the Danube, and no significant revival
of mutual trade happened. Facing failures in his foreign and internal
politics, Károlyi resigned in September 1932, leaving the office to the
general Gömbös. The new PM strengthened the regent's rule, over-
came the acute crisis of the counter-revolutionary regime, and annulled
the state of emergency. During the Gömbös era (1932–1936), collabo-
ration between the Hungary’s democratic opposition and Prague
greatly diminished.
Hungarian Democrats and the Czechoslovak Authorities
1919-32
49
The convoluted and asymmetrical relations that were estab-
lished between Hungarian democratic circles and the ČSR in 1919 can 
create an impression that the opposition naively hoped for Prague's
altruistic assistance against the regime of Miklós Horthy. Nonetheless,
faith in Czechoslovak democratic principles was not universal among
the Hungarian opposition: seeing the oppression of the Magyar minor-
ity in Slovakia, they suspected that behind Prague's grand words of
civic liberties and people's rule stood the strategic and economic inter-
ests of the ČSR. Correspondence, diaries, and memoirs written by the 
Magyar émigrés demonstrate that whenever Prague hesitated to show
full support of the Hungarian democratic project, the exiles would take
it as a sign that Beneš and Bethlen were secretly colluding behind the
democrats' backs. Their opponents, the followers of Horthy, also
doubted Prague's desire to install a democracy in Hungary – and so did
a number of independent observers. For instance, as the fake franc
scandal unfolded in January 1926, the Foreign Office official Miles
Lampson wrote that 'the Little Entente was undoubtedly out for Beth-
len's blood': the military bloc was unwilling to see a strong personality
at the head of the Hungarian government, since that would interfere
with the Little Entente’s plans to spread chaos in Hungary. Lampson
concluded that all talk of democratisation in Hungary was nothing
more than an 'ideal mischievous proposal', which Prague never meant
sincerely.142 Finally, the opponents of Horthy could not consider the
democratisation as a panacea for all Hungarian troubles. For example,
seeing the scale of Great Depression in his country, Mihály Károlyi
wrote to Jászi in July 1932 that “it does not matter if Hungary is ruled
by Horthy, Otto or a republican regime like in Czechoslovakia”,
because a fairer political system would not assure much better
economic situation”.143
After the demise of Bethlen in 1931, Prague seemed to aban-
don its intensive cooperation with the Hungarian democratic move-
ments for the sake of winning the goodwill of official Budapest. In any
case, Hrad had no serious partner among its old anti-Horthyist ac-
quaintances: while the leftist emigration lost much of its previous in-
fluence, its home wing was not powerful either. Another of the opposi-
tion groups – the legitimists, such as Friedrich or Gratz, also possessed
no real influence in Hungary. On the contrary, the new Prime Minister
Gömbös, proved to be a popular politician and showed some inclina-
tion towards cooperation with Prague. But the following years proved
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that Gömbös was more disposed towards collaboration with Berlin and
Rome.
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Historical Trauma and Multidirectional
Memory in the Vojvodina: László Végel’s




In this paper I offer a comparative reading of two Vojvodina-
Hungarian novels, both published in recent years, from the point of
view of their thematizing repressed historical trauma that affected the
Vojvodina in the 20th century. I analyze how the two narratives pro-
pose a more inclusive form of collective memory. László Végel is an
internationally known and widely translated Hungarian writer from the
Vojvodina; Anna Friedrich is a Vojvodina-based Hungarian journalist
with Miért? Warum being her first novel. Neoplanta, avagy az Igéret
földje: Városregény (Neoplanta, or the promised land: Novel about a
city, 2013) and Miért? Warum? Egy jugoszláviai lágert túlélt magyar-
német asszony története (Why? The Story of a Hungarian-German
woman who survived a Yugoslav camp, 2016), both published in Bu-
dapest, are certainly different regarding their literary style and narra-
tive approach. What both novels have in common, however, is their
interest in the question of cultural and historical memory of ethnicity-
based and gender violence brought about with World War II to this
long-established multiethnic and multilingual region ― according to
some scholars, “one of the most multiethnic and multilingual regions
of Europe” (Bugarski) ― that has seen many cultural and border shifts
throughout history.1 Both authors tackle the decade-long silence sur-
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rounding interethnic and sexual violence committed against ethnic
Hungarians and Germans (Swabians), a topic that has long been omit-
ted from the country’s (former Yugoslavia’s and now Serbia’s) official
historiography about World War II. The two narratives, I will argue,
propose what Michael Rothberg termed “multidirectional memory,” a
form of collective memory based on the “interaction of different his-
torical memories,” which Rothberg distinguishes from “competitive
memory,” i.e. a struggle over whose memory and whose pain are more
worthy of remembering (3). Végel and Friedrich thus remind us of the
fact that, particularly in ethnically diverse communities, and even
more so in a region marked by centuries of cultural hybridization,
memories (and I would add, identities), to use Gabriele Schwab’s
words, “are always already composites from dynamically interrelated
and conflicted histories” (30). Opening up the space for multi-
directional memory in a multicultural and hybrid community like the
Vojvodina would constitute a necessary step in coming to terms with
the “haunting legacies” (Schwab) of its not so distant past. The two
novels, I argue, set an important direction in this regard as they both
offer a “working through” of a still unresolved and hence haunting
traumatic past.
László Végel was born in 1941 in Szenttamás/Srbobran
(southern Bácska), and he studied at the University of Novi Sad (the
capital of Vojvodina) and the University of Belgrade. Végel is thus a
typical bilingual Vojvodina-Hungarian intellectual. During Tito’s rule
in Yugoslavia, Végel was one of the most prominent members of the
Vojvodina-Hungarian avant-garde literary circle around the magazine
Új Symposion. A prolific novelist, essay writer and playwright, he
worked for many Yugoslav newspapers and magazines both in Hun-
garian (i.e. Magyar Szó) and Serbo-Croat (i.e. Polja in Novi Sad and
Politika in Belgrade). He was awarded numerous prizes, including
some of the most prestigious ones, such as the Kossuth Prize and the
Gold medal for his overall work (vegel.org/en/). Like other opposition
intellectuals, during the Milošević-years,2 he was subjected to political
persecution and had to go into hiding. His works have been translated
into Serbo-Croat, German, Dutch, English, Slovenian, and Albanian.
He is considered a leading Central European intellectual.
Anna Friedrich was born in 1953 in Bezdán (northern Bácska)
in the Vojvodina. She is a journalist, a psychologist (a graduate of the
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University of Belgrade), and a writer. She lives between Bezdán, Novi
Sad, and Budapest. She worked for the Hungarian-language news-
papers Magyar Szó and Dunatáj, and also for Radio Zombor (that was
abolished a couple of years ago). In her first book Ez még nem tör-
ténelem (This is not yet history, 2006), she used the diary form under
the motto “13 év Belgrádtól Hágáig” (13 years from Belgrade to The
Hague) to document the events of the Milošević-reign that had led to 
the Yugoslav wars and the end of Yugoslavia, and how they affected
the Vojvodina Hungarians.
Both authors tackle the necessity to create a form of collective
memory in the Vojvodina rooted in multidirectional memory practices.
According to Jan Assmann, communicative memory is the cultural
memory kept in families and communities through oral transmission.
The official cultural memory is marked by “figures of memory”:
“events of the past, whose memory is maintained through cultural
formation (texts, rites, monuments) and institutional communication
(recitation, practice, observance)” (Assmann 129). In communist
Yugoslavia cultural memory was defined along the discourse of
“brotherhood and unity” and the constitution of a collective Yugoslav
identity. Although the “brotherhood and unity” ideology certainly
helped to bring about social cohesion, especially among the younger
generation, it also hindered the “working through” of a traumatic past
whose truths were undesired by the communist regime, even danger-
ous to openly talk about, and therefore not revealed until decades later.
Végel’s and Friedrich’s novels both address the haunting of this re-
pressed past. Their narratives can be considered an attempt to create a
counter-narrative to the narrative of the dominant cultural memory and
thus add elements toward the establishment of a multidirectional
memory that would incorporate the hybrid cultural mosaic and its his-
tory in the Vojvodina.
Cultural hybridity, trauma, and haunting
The title of Végel’s novel implies a historical reference. The promised
land refers to the history of Novi Sad when in 1748, the city’s numer-
ous different ethnic groups (Germans, Hungarians, Serbs, Jews etc.)
pulled together and collected the necessary money to buy from Em-
press Maria Theresa the title of “Free Imperial City” for the city she
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named Neoplanta: “Let its name be Neoplanta and let all its people call
it in their own language. May they live in peace and love, and may this
multinational city be an example of the various nations’ peaceful co-
habitation” (Neoplanta, back cover).3 (“Legyen a neve Neoplanta, és
minden nép nevezze saját nyelvén. Éljenek békében, szeressék egy-
mást, ez a soknemzetiségû város legyen példája a különbözô nációk
békés egymás mellett élésének.”) Végel’s novel demonstrates how this
utopia of a peaceful multiethnic coexistence in Neoplanta/Neusatz/
Újvidék/Novi Sad was not only destroyed in the 20th century but that
its official historical memory has been constructed so as to erase cer-
tain chapters, particularly those pertaining to ethnic groups that have
been virtually eradicated from the city’s once multicultural fabric. In
contemporary Serbia, in the official cultural memory there is space for
one gruesome episode of ethnic cleansing perpetuated by the occupy-
ing Hungarian forces in the entire Délvidék, in which 3,309 mainly
Jewish and Serbian civilian victims were brutally murdered (Braham
211). In Novi Sad alone, 879 people were killed (Végel, Neoplanta
293).4 The fact that in 1944-1945 Tito’s partisans conducted a mass
capturing of tens of thousands of Hungarian and German civilians of
all ages who were thrown into concentration camps all over the Vo-
jvodina, where they were brutally tortured, beaten, starved (many to
death) and raped, has been glossed over by Yugoslav and Serbian his-
toriography. Végel sums up this selective historical memory in the fol-
lowing words:
European politics considered Tito’s Yugoslavia a showcase ex-
ample of fair minority politics. The communist elite acknow-
ledged the city’s multinational character, but not its past. The
fact that Novi Sad was multiethnic was always proudly em-
phasized; but its historical past and the reasons behind it were
deliberately suppressed. And so was the question about what
happened to the Germans who had been deported, thrown into
mass graves or perished in work camps. With the city’s im-
pressive development, the leading elite made an attempt to for-
get the past. Their efforts were eased by the fact that the popu-
lation increased, and the newcomers didn’t have anything to
remember. There was no shared past. (Újvidéki képeslapok)
(A titói Jugoszláviát az európai politika a méltányos kisebbség-
politika mintapéldájaként tartotta számon. A kommunista elit
tudomásul vette a város többnemzetiségű jellegét, de a múltját 
már nem. Azt, hogy Újvidék többnemzetiségű, mindig büszkén 
hangoztatták, ellenben az előzményekről, arról, hogy miért, 
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miféle történelmi múlttal rendelkezik, azt tudatosan elhallgat-
ták. Meg azt is, hogy hová lettek az időközben kitelepített vagy 
a tömegsírokba vetett, avagy a munkatáborokban odaveszett
németek. A város lenyűgöző fejlődésével a vezető réteg igye-
kezett feledtetni a múltat. Ügyeskedésüket könnyítette, hogy a
város lélekszáma meghatványozódott, az újaknak nem volt mire
emlékezniük. Nem létezett közös múlt.)
The novel Neoplanta evokes the city’s traumatic past. Its vir-
tual hero is Novi Sad, the capital of Vojvodina since 1945. In a 2014
interview, Végel referred to Novi Sad as a traumatized European city
(Pejčić). The narrative is told through a double lens: the ironic voice of 
the first-person Hungarian narrator, and that of Lazo Pavletić, the Ser-
bian fiacre driver (Bence 81) whose fiacre becomes a silent witness to
the many historical upheavals the city and its inhabitants have to en-
dure during the long 20th century (Bányai 328). It is through the con-
versations of these two characters that the reader is introduced to some
major events that marked the city’s and Vojvodina’s history in the 20th
century. The conversations between the Hungarian narrator and the
Serbian fiacre driver are necessarily multilingual to reflect not only the
linguistic and cultural fusion between the city’s numerous ethnicities
but also their sometimes colliding collective memories. Although Novi
Sad was founded in the spirit of peaceful coexistence, geopolitical in-
terests, wars and population shifts have led to various historical trau-
mas.
Végel’s words about an old café in the heart of Novi Sad,
where his novel places some major fictional events based on sup-
pressed local history, sums up these shifts in the erasure of undesired
historical chapters and the creation of a new cultural memory, always
guided by current political interests:
[…] we stop by at Café Athens in the city centre. Originally,
this was the Dornstädter café and pastry shop. After WWII, this
catering establishment that used to be the property of Jakab
Dornstädter was nationalized and renamed Café Moscow. In
1949, its name was changed to Café Zagreb, and since 1994 to
date, it has been Café Athens [Atina]. These periodic name
changes speak to Novi Sad’s rather painful history” (Újvidéki
képeslapok).
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([...] betérünk a központban lévő Athén kávézóba, amely ere-
detileg a valamikori Dornstädter kávéház, illetve cukrászda
volt. A II. világháború után a Dornstädter Jakab tulajdonát ké-
pező vendéglátó-ipari létesítményt államosították, ezután 
Moszkva lett. 1949-ben Zágrábra keresztelték, majd 1994-től 
egészen napjainkig Athén. Az időközönkénti névcserékben re-
jtőzik Újvidék története, amely felettébb kínos.)  
The continuous name change of the café that carried the name
of its Jewish owner (who “disappears” during the war) in the interwar
years, reflects the historical changes that have swept through the city
and the entire region leaving behind their unresolved traumas: from the
Holocaust to the Soviet-influenced first years of communist Yugo-
slavia (Moscow), to the “brotherhood and unity” motto of Tito’s
Yugoslavia following the split with Stalin (hence Zagreb, the capital of
Croatia), to the post-Yugoslav developments, which mirrors the 1990s
era of the Milošević-rule and its aftermath with a desire for closer ties 
to the Balkans (Athens) and a breaking away from an Austro-
Hungarian past. (See Appendix, Picture 1).
In his novel Végel casts a seemingly secondary female charac-
ter, the waitress of Café Dornstädter who becomes a witness to the
dramatic historical changes of which the café is the focal point. She
also happens to be the fiacre driver’s mother and embodies the city’s
multilingual and hybrid character in a gendered way: not only does she
evade all definitions along single national lines (“She may have been a
Slovak woman, but perhaps she was Hungarian” — “Szlovák nő le-
hetett, de lehet, hogy magyar volt”, 63), she also speaks several lan-
guages fluently: Hungarian, Serbian, German and Slovak. She some-
times uses the name Horák Katalin, sometimes Katarina Horakova,
thus fitting Assmann’s definition of cultural identity as a social con-
struct in response to the expectations of our social environment (qtd. in
Rudaš 96-97). Horák Katalin/Katarina Horakova is thus a perfect ex-
ample of Vojvodina’s cultural hybridity. Her shifting between cultural
identities and ethnic allegiances illustrates what Homi Bhabha formu-
lated as a challenge to the illusion of a homogenous national identity:
“the inherent originality or ‘purity’ of cultures are untenable” (156) ― 
especially in a region like the Vojvodina. The cultural hybridity that
Katarina/Katalin embodies makes her the perfect person to work at
Café Dornstädter where all ethnic groups meet and where all lan-
guages are spoken before WWII. Whereas the fiacre driver’s Serbian
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father (who had also been a fiacre driver) struggles with the different
languages, it is thanks to the mother’s multilingual talents, her malle-
able hybrid identity, and her astute talent of observation coupled with
her survival skills that the family manages to move unharmed through
the Hungarian occupation during the war and the subsequent libera-
tion/occupation by the Red Army and Tito’s partisans. While the son
(later the fiacre driver), following his return from the war as a Hungar-
ian soldier, is forced to demonstrate his Serbian allegiance by shooting
into an unmarked mass grave his two best friends, a Hungarian and a
German, thus symbolically killing the multiethnic character of his city
and his own hybridity, his mother is cast as a witness to and carrier of
Novi Sad’s and Vojvodina’s multidirectional memory, in particular
those parts that have been erased from official cultural memory. The
most vivid and disturbing episode is her witnessing the orgy organized
by local partisan supporters at the “nationalized” Café Dornstädter for
the sake of appeasing the drunken misbehaviour of Soviet soldiers to-
ward their Serbian female comrades. Instead, local “traitor” German
families are “punished” for their non-Serbian ethnicity and “bour-
geois” identity: their female members, in particular their young daugh-
ters, like the former ball queen Miss Meinert, are dragged away from
their homes in the middle of the night to be thrown into the rape orgy
at the mercy of the soldiers while exposed to the vulgar gaze of the
grinning crowds gathered on the street in front of the café’s windows.
The only eye witness to this violent episode ― an episode that be-
comes erased from the city’s cultural memory ― who comments on its 
lasting traumatic impact is the waitress: “when did the lace curtains
become yellow, why were the plush arm chairs creaky, why is the
floor covering so dirty?” (Végel, Neoplanta 78) (“[…] mikor sárgultak
meg a csipkefüggönyök, miért nyikorognak a plüssfotelek, miért olyan
koszos a padlóburkolat?”). It is thus the place itself, the café that con-
tinues to carry the haunting memory of this less than heroic episode
from the end of the war. Against all effort that has been made to erase
this memory and construct a new one, Végel’s narrative evokes the
former’s ghosts. Avery Gordon understands the ghost not as the return
of a dead or missing person but rather as a sign that demands “not a
return to the past but a reckoning with its repression in the present”
(183) ― hence the necessity to include it as part of a multidirectional 
memory. The ghosts of the city’s repressed traumatic past that the Café
Dornstädter exemplifies are not present in a physical way; instead,
they exist, in Gordon’s words, as a “seething presence” (8). By putting
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this violent episode right at the beginning of the regime change follow-
ing WWII, the author adds an important element to the creation of a
multidirectional cultural memory in that he breaks the silence regard-
ing the murder and rapes perpetuated by the “liberating” armies (both
the Soviets and the partisans) against the local population, in particular
the Germans and Hungarians, and more specifically, the women, a
topic that had been taboo for decades.5
Gendering multidirectional memory
Friedrich’s novel expands on the gender aspect in the establishing of a
multidirectional memory about Vojvodina’s post-WWII history. Even
more than Végel, she bases her fictionalized narrative on historical
facts. Her heroine, Róza/Rosalia Emling, is based on the real story of a
young Hungarian-German girl from Novi Sad who was taken as a
teenager to one of the infamous concentration camps that were estab-
lished under Tito’s regime all over the Vojvodina (Schwartz, “Inter-
view”). To add more veracity to her narrative, Friedrich includes a de-
tailed map with the locations of the camps and numbers of the victims.
(See Appendix, Picture 2).6
Róza is raped ten times and is saved thanks to the help and
intervention of a courageous girlfriend who manages to bring her some
food and clothes. Róza’s mother dies in the camp whereas Róza sur-
vives and, following her release, lives with her surviving grandmother.
Later she moves to (West) Germany where she joins her brother and,
gradually working through her trauma, starts a new life and eventually,
a family of her own. What helps her in this process is also the fact that
she meets a German woman, Lujza, who survived gang rapes by
American GIs and remained childless as a consequence. Lujza sup-
ports Róza and understands what she went through. By including Lu-
jza’s story in the narrative, Friedrich addresses the universal theme of
sexual violence that millions of women experienced at the hand of sol-
diers of all backgrounds during WWII and following Nazi Germany’s
defeat all over Nazi-occupied Europe and the former Soviet Union.7
Friedrich’s description of the rapes is reminiscent of other rape
narratives, such as Alaine Polcz’s Asszony a fronton or Judit Kováts’s
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Megtagadva in Hungarian literature but also of rape narratives from
German literature by teenage survivors such as Gabi Köpp or Leonie
Biallas. The Serbian rapist in Miért? Warum? smells of onion and
brandy (similar to the Soviet rapists in the other narratives), and the
experience of Róza’s first rape is described in similar terms: sharp
pain, a knife cutting her flesh, her fear that her back will break and her
abdomen be torn, disgust, choking:
As he lifted my leg, the thought flashed through my mind that
he would break my back.
My god, I will die!
Then I felt a sharp pain.
He stabbed me with a knife, I thought, and the ripping pain
made me think that he was cutting the flesh of my lower ab-
domen. [...] The bastard, panting, held down both my hands
while I could feel his breath in my mouth. The smell of onions
and brandy made my stomach turn. I felt like throwing up and
thought I would choke, but the feeling that he would tear up my
lower abdomen was even more frightening. (71)
([...] Ahogy felemelte az egyik lábamat, felvillant bennem,
hogy el fogja törni a derekam. Istenem, meghalok!
Aztán éles fájdalmat éreztem.
Kést döfött belém, gondoltam, és a hasító fájdalomról azt hit-
tem, hogy az alsótestemben a húsomat vagdossa. [...] A dög li-
hegve szorította mindkét kezemet, miközben a számba lehelt, és
a hagymás pálinkaszagtól felgyülemlett a nyál a számban.
Hányni akartam volna, és úgy éreztem, megfulladok, de a ful-
doklásnál remisztőbb volt az érzés, hogy széttépi az alsó-
testem.)8
What distinguishes Friedrich’s narrative from the narratives
mentioned above is that Róza starts to count while being raped, a strat-
egy of keeping her spirit at distance from the terrible violence her body
has to endure. Róza counts in three languages, beginning with Hungar-
ian, switching to German and finally to Serbian while her rapist mur-
murs insults and swear words into her ear in Serbian. What the author
describes here can thus be interpreted as the metaphorical rape of Vo-
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jvodina’s multilingual identity by a monolingual, brutal force. More-
over, this multilingual identity is gendered as female as the brutal force
“taking” Róza’s body is the metaphorical conquest of Vojvodina by a
colonizing, armed patriarchal power. With the rape of Róza, multi-
lingualism and cultural hybridity are superseded by monolingualism
and the imposition of a single ethnic identity, which stands for the en-
suing loss of a multiethnic community.
The author weaves in her expertise as a psychologist into
Róza’s story which is told back and forth between the present and the
past, a narrative strategy that allows for the demonstration of how
traumatic experiences and memories survive in the body and the mind,
even decades later, in flashbacks, nightmares, and uncontrollable
movements. One example of this traumatic re-enactment is Róza feel-
ing nausea and clenching her fist while flashbacks shoot through her
mind in situations in which her body is reminded of the past wound,
such as when she smells brandy from a nearby co-worker’s breath:
My stomach was lifted, my back sank, and squeezing my
thumb between my four fingers, I clenched my right fist and
pressed it firmly against my stomach. My right knee collapsed
as if instinctively trying to make myself look smaller than I
really was. These movements returned periodically when the
images I had buried appeared in front of me in a flash, like now
under the influence of the smell of brandy. (39)
(A gyomrom megemelkedett, a hátam megroggyant és a
hüvelykujjamat a négy ujjam közé fogva ökölbe szorult a jobb
kezem és erősen a hasamra szorítottam. A jobb lábam térdben 
meghajlott, mintha ösztönösen kisebbnek akarnék látszani, mint
amekkora vagyok. Ezek a mozdulatok vissza-visszatértek oly-
ankor, amikor egy villanásra megjelentek előttem az elhantolt 
képek, most éppen a pálinkaszag hatására.)
Róza obviously suffers from PTSD (post-traumatic stress dis-
order). Cathy Caruth speaks of the temporal aspect of PTSD as a be-
lated response to a traumatic event, an event that at the time when it
hits a person, he/she is unable to process given that the consciousness
shuts down as a protective reaction while numbness ensues (4). Hence
the uncontrollable repetitive behaviour as a belated “acting out” of the
traumatic impact. According to Dominick LaCapra, in the acting out of
the compulsive repetition the past occurrences intrude in the present
(142). Essentially, acting out means reliving the past, i.e. the unsettled
Historical Trauma and Memory in the Vojvodina 71
ghosts of the past event continue their haunting in the present. As we
are reminded by LaCapra, in order to come to terms with the traumatic
past, a “working through” has to happen. Working through does not
mean that a traumatized person is completely “cured”; it does, how-
ever, bring a temporal structure into a traumatized person's life and
allows him/her to distinguish between past, present, and the future. In
other words, working through allows the victim to move beyond vic-
timhood and gain agency, an agency that still allows to keep the mem-
ory of the past, which Róza succeeds in doing. She honours the mem-
ory of her own past and that of the lost loved ones while she gradually
comes to terms with her wound and is able to become successful in her
new environment in Germany, a loving friend and eventually a wife
and mother.
Nevertheless, Róza/Rosalia never really feels at home in Ger-
many; despite her partly German background and her new life, she
feels like a foreigner in her new country. With her cultural hybridity,
she no longer belongs anywhere as her once multiethnic and multi-
lingual village in the Vojvodina has been populated by a new mono-
lingual population that replaced the expelled one. Thus despite her
successfully moving forward and beyond her traumatic past, Róza
never forgets how absurd all what happened to her and her family was.
Hence the title of the novel and the sentence in the concluding para-
graph: “Why did all what happened happen, Róza?” (Friedrich 184)
(“Miért volt mindez, Róza?”). Although partly fictional, Róza’s story
is an important element in the creation of a multidirectional memory
for the forgotten (or rather edited out) war crimes committed against
the Vojvodina Hungarians and Germans, in particular the women,
whose story of sexual violation at the end of WWII is covered by an
additional layer of silence. How much of a taboo Friedrich is breaking
with her book is reflected in the fact that even two years after its publi-
cation, the central library of the Vojvodina, the Matica Srpska Library
in Novi Sad, still does not own a copy.9
Végel’s novel ends in the narrator’s failed attempt to have his
Serbian fiacre driver friend buried, according to the latter’s own
wishes, in the same unmarked mass grave into which his two friends
he was forced to shoot, the Hungarian and the German, were thrown.
The fiacre, that bridge that survived through wars and generations, is
taken by a schlemihl10-kind of character who suddenly appears on the
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last two pages, repeating a few sentences in a language the narrator
does not understand but that contains words from Hungarian, Serbian,
and German mixed with incomprehensible words. The narrator an-
swers him in English, the lingua franca of the 21st century, but to no
avail. Upon several failed communication attempts, the schlemihl
grabs the fiacre by the beam and drags it away, disappearing in the
twilight, taking with him his hybrid language, perhaps a linguistic uto-
pia for the 21st century that nobody can understand, not even a multi-
lingual citizen of Novi Sad, that once utopian city of peaceful multi-
lingual cohabitation.
Conclusion
Jutka Rudaš notes with respect to Végel’s novel that it “celebrates the
heterogeneity of cultural experience” (92) (“éltetve a kulturális tapasz-
talat heterogenitását”). Végel’s and Friedrich’s narratives are im-
portant attempts, both with their own focus and in their own genre, to
diversify the still dominant cultural memory about Vojvodina’s history
― a memory reinforced by the Serbian nationalist government and its 
essentially anti-constitutional cultural policies (see Bugarski) ― to-
ward a multidirectional memory, a memory that would take into ac-
count the region’s hybrid cultural past and its legacies in the present.
In order to come to terms with the haunting effects of these memories
that until recently were covered under a veil of silence, these violent
episodes have to be given their appropriate place within cultural mem-
ory, i.e. offered what Jacques Derrida calls “a hospitable memory [...]
out of concern for justice” (qtd. in Gordon, Ghostly Matters 58), “so as
to overcome their pulsating and lingering effects” (134) on individuals
and communities.11 Rothberg’s emphasis on multidirectional memory
takes us in the same direction when it comes to settling the ghosts of
memory competition:
If memory is as susceptible as any other human faculty to
abuse ―  [...] this study seeks to emphasize how memory is at 
least as often a spur to unexpected acts of empathy and solidar-
ity; indeed multidirectional memory is often the very grounds
on which people construct and act upon visions of justice. (19)
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It is therefore urgent to listen to the ghosts of past traumas and
injustices; they remind us that what happened in the past may happen
again, and that it may very well happen to any of us: “it could be you. I
could be you” (Gordon, “Some Thoughts” 13). According to Gordon,
we need to engage with the ghosts of the past so as to arrive at a
“transformative recognition” (Ghostly Matters 8) which, beyond the
memory of a painful and violent past, also carries the hope for future
reconciliation and the need to find ways to prevent such traumas from
reoccurring.
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NOTES
1 According to Gábrity-Molnár et al., the multiethnic character of the
Vojvodina was largely established following the Battle of Zenta in 1697
fought against the Ottoman Empire. The nearly depopulated lowlands ― a
consequence of migratory processes induced by the Ottoman conquest in the
previous centuries ― now became an attraction point for many migration 
waves that were largely determined by policies from Habsburg Vienna. A
resettlement of Southern Hungary (Délvidék; later named Vojvodina by the
Serbian population) began in the 18th century. Ethnic Germans from southern
parts of Germany (so-called Danube Swabians) were one of the largest
groups, but ethnic Hungarians also moved in along with many other smaller
ethnic groups from all over the Habsburg territories (Slovaks, Czechs, Jews,
Croats, Ukrainians, Ruthenians, Romanians etc.). Two big waves of Serbian
refugees referred to as the “Great migration of the Serbs” fleeing Ottoman-
controlled Serbia brought large numbers of Serbs into the area as well. Fol-
lowing the Treaty of Trianon, the newly established Serbian-Croatian-
Slovenian Kingdom, later renamed Yugoslavia, was given the territory of the
Vojvodina. However, well into the 20th century, no ethnic group could claim
an absolute majority. Despite aggressive attempts by the Serbian king to “ser-
bianize” the area by creating new Serbian settlements and thus breaking up
the linguistic territory of the other ethnic groups, 1931 census figures still
indicate that only one third of the area’s population were ethnic Serbs. The
expulsion and/or murder of nearly 350,000 ethnic Germans and the settlement
of over 200,000 ethnic Serbs after World War II initiated the process of the
erosion of Vojvodina’s ethnic and linguistic diversity. Although what re-
mained of the diversity was guaranteed by the constitution and cultural poli-
cies in Tito’s Yugoslavia, the balance continued to shift in favour of a Serbian
majority that was firmly established by the 1960s. Since the Yugoslav wars of
the 1990s that brought about further ethnically determined migrations, this
shift has become further pronounced. The shrinking of the Hungarian but also
other non-Serb ethnic groups continues at an alarming rate. On current trends,
according to Branislav Djurdjev, a demographer at the University of Novi
Sad, Vojvodina will be 90% Serb by the end of the 21st century. The remain-
ing 10% will consist largely of Hungarians and Roma. Of the 350,000 ethnic
Germans only 4,000 remain today in Serbia.
2 Slobodan Milošević was a Serbian politician, President of Serbia be-
tween 1989 and 1997, and President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
from 1997-2000. Given his rise to power in the 1980s, he was chiefly res-
ponsible for the ignition of Serbian nationalistic politics that, along with simi-
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lar politics by his Croatian counterpart, Franjo Tudjman, led to the catastro-
phic and bloody break-up of multinational, multiethnic, and multilingual
Yugoslavia along single national ideologies. It is also thanks to Milošević that 
Vojvodina (along with Kosovo) lost its previous autonomy which had been
granted to both provinces in the 1970s under Tito.
3 All translations from the Hungarian by Agatha Schwartz.
4 Randolph L. Braham gives the following ethnic breakdown of the
Újvidék massacre: 550 Jews, 292 Serbs, 13 Russians, and 11 Hungarians
(211).
5 In the Hungarian context, this taboo topic has been recently re-
searched more extensively. See Schwartz on the representation of the rapes in
Hungarian literature; Márta Mészáros’ 2017 feature film Aurora borealis:
Északi fény; and Andrea Pető’s 2018 monograph Elmondani az elmond-
atatlant.
In the context of the Vojvodina and former Yugoslavia, the rapes
committed during World War II have not been researched. In Serbian scholar-
ship, there are only sporadic references to the rapes perpetuated against local
women. Milovan Djilas in his internationally known Conversations with Sta-
lin addresses this less than heroic behaviour of the Soviet soldiers, a comment
jovially glossed over by his interlocutor. The rape of German women who
survived Tito’s camps has so far only been addressed in the groundbreaking
publication Dunavske Švabice where the editors mention the rapes in their
introduction, a fact that their interviewees, elderly ethnic German women, did
not wish to have included in their respective narratives collected in the vol-
ume. One of the editors, Nadežda Radović, told me in an interview that in one 
case, it was the son of one of the interviewed women who did not wish to see
his mother’s name “tainted” by publishing this particular detail about her
camp experience. Thus it is still the victim who has to feel ashamed, even
decades later, while the perpetrators evade justice.
6 Friedrich’s source for the map is http://www.keskenyut.hu/.
7 The number of women raped in World War II and its aftermath will
likely remain an estimate given the complex issue of memorializing wartime
rape and the mechanisms of silence that surround rape as a social phenome-
non (in war as in peace time), but historians talk about millions of women
affected both in Nazi-occupied territories — which includes Germany both
before and following Allied occupation, especially taking into account female
concentration camp inmates and forced labourers — and in territories liber-
ated by the Allies.
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8 On Hungarian women writers’ narratives of wartime rapes see
Schwartz.
9 It ought to be mentioned that at times, Friedrich inserts into her nar-
rative ethnocentric comments that go against the conciliatory passages in oth-
er parts of the novel.
10 In American slang, schlemiel usually means an awkward or unlucky
person. The origin of the word is Hebrew and Yiddish and was made famous
by German late Romantic writer Adalbert von Chamisso and his novella
“The Wonderful History of Peter Schlemihl” (Peter Schlemihls wundersame
Geschichte, 1813).
11 In 2017, with the support and encouragement of German chancellor
Angela Merkel, a monument to the murdered and expelled Danube Swabians
was erected by the Serbian government on the site of the notorious camp in
Jarek (north of Novi Sad) where about 6,500 ethnic Germans had been killed
between 1944 and 1946. Vojvodina Hungarians have unofficially erected
some small memory sites (which have repeatedly been vandalized) in various
places where civilians had been murdered at the end of World War II. The
erection of a multilingual monument in Novi Sad to all civilian victims at the
end of World War II has been debated since 2016.
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Symbol or Concept?
An Overview of the Doctrine of the
Holy Crown of Hungary
Gábor Hollósi
On the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the United States
returning to Hungary her symbol of enduring constitutionality, the
story of the Holy Crown is once again front and center. Our use of the
word “symbol” already in the very first sentence is intentional, for in
addition to the “visible” manifestation of the crown, an “invisible”
aspect surrounds it as well.1 The invisible crown represents a set of
ideas that is embodied in our Holy Crown. Throughout the history of
our constitution, the most important of these is the so-called Doctrine
of the Holy Crown, which is what we focus on below.
How do the Concept of the Holy Crown and the Doctrine of the
Holy Crown differ?
Although the literature often uses the terms interchangeably, we
believe that separately defining them is more appropriate.2 The Con-
cept of the Holy Crown covers the symbolism of the crown (for now
let us set aside the point from which we may consider the Hungarian
crown as holy). For example in King St. Stephen’s (1001–1038) Ad-
monitions to his son Prince Emeric, the crown appears as both earthly
royal authority and as the symbol of heavenly and eternal power.3
Later, the Holy Crown itself came to symbolize the territory of the
state; we often come across the phrase: “Lands of the Holy Crown”.
These are, of course, only examples. In our work we do not attempt to
provide an overarching analysis of symbology of the crown.
In contrast to the mentioned symbols, the Doctrine of the Holy
Crown is a public law (“constitutional law”) tenet whose first phrasing
can be traced to legal theorist and statesman István Werbőczy (ap-
proximately 1458–1541), who was a judge on the royal high court.
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The starting point of the Doctrine is that the Hungarian state is com-
posed of the king and the nation. (At that time, one’s status as nobility,
rather than what his mother tongue was, determined whether he belong
to the nation.) The two main components of the state, the king and the
nation, together made up the “whole body of the Holy Crown”. The
supreme authority of the state thus belonged to the whole body of the
Holy Crown. Thus it follows that on the one hand, the members of the
nation participate in the wielding of state power through the right of
the crown, while on the other hand, the king is not inherently endowed
with power, but rather acquires it through the right of the crown. As
such, coronation in Hungary was not a formal ceremony, but rather a
public law act: through the coronation, royal power passed from the
crown to the king.4 Thus the essential element of the Doctrine is
division of power; in Hungary an autocratic monarch or despot (in mo-
dern parlance: a dictatorial “President of the Republic”) is not recog-
nized.
A short phylogeny on the Doctrine of the Holy Crown
The progression of symbology is naturally connected to the Doctrine,
so from this perspective it is important to note that by the 15th century
in Hungary, the Holy Crown no longer represented the power of the
king, but rather the authority of the state independent of the king. This
had already been the case in 1401, when Hungarian King Sigismund of
Luxembourg (1387–1437) was detained and the barons considered his
throne abrogated. The royal council metamorphosed into a country-
wide council that exercised power in the name of the Holy Crown.5
In Tripartitum (Triple Codex, The Customary Law of the Re-
nowned Kingdom of Hungary: A Work in Three Parts), published in
1514, István Werbőczy created the Doctrine by connecting the notion 
of division of powers with the Holy Crown, which symbolized the
authority of the state, and with organic approach to the state concept.
(Organic state concept, which draws a comparison of the state to a
living body, had already been made in ancient times. In Ancient Rome,
for example, Menenius Agrippa had compared the state to a human
body, made up equally of patricians and plebeians.6 Although the
Church conveyed organic state concept in the image of the body of
Christ during the Middle Ages, Werbőczy could have been familiar 
with this symbolism via his studies of Roman law, as evidenced by his
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attempts at imparting some Roman legal rules in Tripartitum. That
these rules were not implemented in jurisprudential practice is another
question, however.)
In one of the most often quoted parts of Tripartitum, Wer-
bőczy wrote the following about the mutual interdependence between 
ruler and nobility, a.k.a. division of powers: “…because the prince
[ruler] is chosen only by noblemen, who are noblemen by the grace of
the prince… […] And these noblemen […] are considered as members
of the Holy Crown.”7 The latter sentence mirrors organic state concept,
in which Werbőczy replaced the human body with the Holy Crown. It 
is true that Werbőczy tried instead to trace equal participation in legis-
lative power to the principle of sovereignty of the people,8 but we also
do not contend that he formulated a final and comprehensive portrayal
of the Doctrine. The Doctrine came to full “maturity” in the 19th cen-
tury via public law scholars.
 By the Habsburg era, Werbőczy’s construction had begun to 
crumble, although in 1553, under Ferdinand I, the Quadripartitum
(Quaternary Codex) was finished, which still recognized the Doctrine
of the Holy Crown,9 and Baron Péter Révay, Turóc County Lord Lieu-
tenant and Royal Crown Guard,10 published De sacra corona regni
Hungariae... in 1613, in which he referred to it as “the law of laws”. In
1687, however, the right of election of kings was suspended under
Leopold I; thus from the 17th century, the crown reverted to being but
an emblem symbolizing the power of the king. Additionally, the sym-
bology had also come to mean continuity in terms of territorial integ-
rity, which could already be well perceived by the 19th century. (In
1848, union between Hungary and Transylvania had to be demanded.)
Constitutional reforms in 1848 had an impact on the Doctrine
of the Holy Crown, too, as prior to 1848, only landowning nobility
were considered to be members of the Holy Crown. From this point,
however, based on the principle of equal rights of citizenship, every
commoner, including peasants, became a member. Moreover – in
connection to the abolition of Aviticum – main landownership of the
Holy Crown ceased, which was related to the territory of the country.11
(For earlier, the Holy Crown Domain Doctrine considered the Holy
Crown as the root of every right of possession.)
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 The theories of Werbőczy were modernized by the public law 
scholars and legal historians of the Era of the Dual Monarchy. Legal
historian Imre Hajnik12 (1840–1902) considered the parliament as the
body of the crown that unified the king and the “nobility” (i.e. the
nation). He was also the originator of the term “Doctrine of the Holy
Crown”. According to Hajnik, Hungarians were characterized by their
public law thinking, unlike the liege societies of the West. The
Doctrine of the Holy Crown also mirrors this public law mentality.13
Ákos Timon14 (1850–1925) was the one, however, who really
worked out the Doctrine, enriching it with a singular mysticism. From
Timon’s perspective, the Doctrine was no longer limited by time and
space, for he believed that the main elements at the time of the
Carpathian Conquest still prevailed in his era. He considered the
Doctrine of the Holy Crown as a “hungaricum”, as something uniquely
belonging to the Hungarians, in the sense that this personification of
the crown could not be found anywhere else on Earth. He was con-
vinced that the Doctrine was “the most distinctive creation on the
evolution of the constitution of the Hungarian nation”,15 the signi-
ficance of which was comparable only to that of the English.
Timon’s views and historiography
By the beginning of the 20th century, Timon’s views had come under
fire. Among others, historian Gyula Szekfű16 (1883–1955) also saw the
roots of the Doctrine of the Holy Crown in the emergence of an
“estates of the realm” system in Hungarian society, rather than in the
Hungarian public law genius that spanned uninterruptedly several
different eras. He associated the whole conception of the Doctrine to
Werbőczy’s work. However, among the public lawyers of the Horthy 
Era17 – chiefly Móric Tomcsányi18 (1878–1951) and Kálmán Molnár19
(1881–1961) – Timon’s approach was the decisive winner. The
catalyst for the debate, which remains unsettled to this day, was an
outline study20 published by legal historian Ferenc Eckhart21 (1885–
1957) in 1931.
Before we summarize the main points of contention, we must
touch upon a few paradoxes. For example, as Timon had died in 1925,
Eckhart had to debate the contemporary legal scholars and politicians
who shared Timon’s views. While Eckhart lacked a degree in juris-
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prudence, neither were the public legal scholars against whom he
debated liberal arts historians. Tomcsányi emphatically stated that the
history of law was “important as an independent discipline, while at
the same time being an auxiliary discipline of public law”.22 Thus the
two sides talked past each other and could not reconcile their intel-
lectual differences. Moreover, the debate scarcely touched on the
essence of Doctrine of the Holy Crown. According to historian Elemér
Mályusz (1898–1989): “Timon’s explanation barely broached the
Doctrine of the Holy Crown”.23 Eckhart himself declared that the
debate added nothing to the history of the Doctrine of the Holy Crown.
Only In 1941, ten years after the beginning of the debate, was The
History of the Concept of the Holy Crown published, which was a
book that Eckhart had written in the wake of the debate. Finally, we
must emphasize that with his 1931 outline study, Eckhart had wanted
to provide a critical approach to legal historiography, but Timon’s
views were perfectly suited for the post-Treaty of Trianon24 emotional
atmosphere.25 His paper generated so much indignation that, for ex-
ample, Gábor Ugron Jr. demanded that he be stripped of his profes-
sorship.
Eckhart denied that the Doctrine of the Holy Crown could be
traced back to St. Stephen. According to his view, the early version of
the Doctrine could not be found in the Admonitions. Only from the
15th century does the Hungarian crown express the king and the
estates’ collective power. We believe that it is not necessarily approp-
riate to look for symbology of the crown in the Admonitions since the
essence of the doctrine is division of power. Different questions
entirely are when to consider the concept of division of power coming
into association with the Holy Crown, and who shared power (in
addition to the king) via the division of power, and to what extent their
power extended. If we peruse the Admonitions from this point of view,
we can come upon an intriguing passage: “The council installs kings
and decides the fate of kings…”26 In our view, this “rhymes” with the
lines quoted by Werbőczy. 
Eckhart had a Concept of the Holy Crown that was continu-
ously altered in context, changing in accordance with the significance
of the role played by various social groups which shared power with
the king. Kálmán Molnár, however, emphasized constitutional-
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historical continuity, and that the genius of Hungarian public law did
not necessarily shine through the sources.
Eckhart also considered the development of Hungarian law as
unique, but not isolated, for in his opinion, the Hungarian doctrine of
the crown drew upon Polish and Czech influences. He stated that
drawing a parallel between English and Hungarian circumstances was
nothing more than “fantasy arising from national hubris”.27 According
to Tomcsányi, other nations, including the English, also employed a
state concept based upon a duality of royal authority and individual
freedom. However, these lacked a construction as eloquent as our
Doctrine of the Holy Crown. In neither England nor France was
coronation as significant as in Hungary. For the principle of rex non
moritur (The king never dies), according to which the throne is never
vacated because the rightful heir of the king immediately assumes
power the moment the king dies, was alien to Hungarians. Under
French public law, this principle was referred to as le roi est mort, vive
le roi (The king is dead, long live the king!) In contrast, the Holy
Crown was the representative of the continuity of royal power in
Hungary.28
Indicative of this was that prior to the coronation of Vladislaus
I (1440–1444), Elizabeth of Luxembourg, daughter of King Sigis-
mund, purloined the Holy Crown in order to have her 3-month-old son
Ladislaus the Posthumous (1444–1457) crowned. In response, how-
ever, the estates decreed that their will was the source of royal power
rather than the crown (1440). Starting from this basis, Tomcsányi
determined that in the event of the destruction of the Holy Crown, the
nation had the right to substitute for it, and if necessary could also
replace the royal body as well. From a public law perspective, this was
a(n) (additional) basis for the regency of Miklós Horthy.29
Eckhart justifiably stated that the public lawyers had not made
use of source criticism. For example, the points of the Etelköz Blood
Oath30 as recorded by Anonymus31 were considered as authentic
sources by Tomcsányi and Molnár. Even though there was no critical
historiography during the Middles Ages, proto-historiographers wil-
lingly projected the thinking of their time onto the past. Siding with
the historians, Emma Bartoniek32 (1894–1957) also pointed out that
Timon had improperly formulated the theory of the Holy Crown in
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many respects, for he had relied only on Werbőczy’s work and some 
medieval documents.33 However, we must reiterate that our view is
that emphasis should not be put on the authenticity of the Blood Oath,
but rather on whether or not there had been any division of power in
ancient Hungarian society. If yes, then it could be considered a pre-
cursor of the later Doctrine of the Holy Crown.
The debate continues to this day
The debate did not end in the Horthy Era, but rather subsided. The
second debate, which took place in the 1950’s, contributed to Eck-
hart’s declining health and eventual death. Because of his participation
in the 1956 Hungarian Revolution,34 he was accused of working on
“inappropriate” intellectual history, but death saved him from persecu-
tion. The third debate regarding the longevity of the Doctrine of the
Holy Crown took place in the wake of the 1989/90 System Change-
over,35 and continues to this day.36
It is an undeniable fact, however, that the “invisible crown”
played a significant role in the move of the Holy Crown from the
Hungarian National Museum to the Hungarian Parliament Building at
the turn of the Hungarian Millennium.37 Recognizing its role in the
historic constitution of Hungary, the Fundamental Law of Hungary,
passed in 2011, reads as follows: “We honor the achievements of our
historical constitution and we honor the Holy Crown, which embodies
the constitutional continuity of Hungary’s statehood and the unity of
the nation.”38
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Book Reviews
Katalin Fábián and Elżbieta Korolczuk, eds. Rebellious Parents:
Parental Movements in Central-Eastern Europe and Russia.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2017. 364 pages. ISBN
9780253026675.
The twelve chapters collected in this well-researched and carefully
edited volume discuss civic movements of parental groups that have
emerged since the 1990s in several countries of the formerly Soviet-
controlled part of Europe and in post-communist Russia. Two chapters
each discuss Russia and the Ukraine, one chapter each is devoted to
Bulgaria, Poland, the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) and
Hungary, while three chapters discuss developments in the Czech
Republic. The contributors’ research is interdisciplinary in that it
covers several disciplines from the social sciences: sociology, anthro-
pology, political science, gender studies, and disability studies. Several
chapters use photographs to add a visual dimension to their discussion.
The editors, who are also authors and/or co-authors of some of
the chapters, are established experts in the fields of women's and gen-
der studies and feminism in Central and Eastern Europe and Russia.
Katalin Fábián, Professor at Lafayette College, is editor of Domestic
Violence in Postcommunist States: Local Activism, National Policies,
and Global Forces (2010) and author of Contemporary Women's
Movements in Hungary: Globalization, Democracy, and Gender
Equality (2009) as well as of numerous other scholarly contributions,
while Elżbieta Korolczuk, Lecturer at Warsaw University and 
Researcher at Södertörn University, is co-editor of several volumes on
motherhood and fatherhood in Poland and Russia, such as Dangerous
Liaisons: Motherhood, Fatherhood and Politics (2015) and Civil
Society Revisited: Lessons from Poland (2017). As Fábián and
Korolczuk explain in the volume’s introduction, their use of the term
Book Reviews94
“parental movements” in lieu of the more familiar “parents’ move-
ments” stems from the latter’s more limited concern with custody,
welfare and health care, whereas parental movements operate at the
intersection of parenthood, gender, national identity, and citizenship
thus covering a much broader range of issues. Most notably, the
contributions have been selected beyond an expected focus on
women’s activism and motherhood; instead, several chapters highlight
the often overlooked engagement of men and fathers, which along
with research on parental activism is an emerging field in the region
generally — and, as the editors point out, wrongly — perceived as
characterized by a weaker civil society compared to the so-called
West.
Moving away from a focus on activism framed within the
much older tradition of women’s rights and more particularly mother-
hood is an important methodological nuance. By choosing the gender-
neutral term “parents” rather than “mothers”, and adding an emphasis
on “fathers” in some cases, these parental movements in formerly
communist countries reflect significant downward trends with respect
to the symbolic position of motherhood and mothering and to
women’s social and political position in post-communism in general,
along with a return to more conservative gender and family values. By
no means have the parental movements under scrutiny always em-
braced a liberal-progressive and inclusive stance beyond the hetero-
normative family model but have rather been coupled with traditi-
onalist, nationalist and essentialist ideas harking back to sometimes
idealized pre-communist family models presented as more “authentic”,
even “natural” and in line with “our” traditions. This anti-communist
and anti-modernist neo-traditionalism interestingly often goes hand in
hand with a critical view on post-communist neo-liberal capitalist
developments and their erosion of some of communism’s achieve-
ments viewed in a more positive light, such as state-funded healthcare
and child support. Thus these recent manifestations of parental ac-
tivism in the other Europe happen at an intersection of various
ideological influences. Ina Dimitrova’s term “reactionary techno-prog-
ressivism” in the chapter on reproductive technologies in Bulgaria
expresses very well this combination of a (usually anti-modernist)
conservative discourse with that of technological and scientific
modernization.
Book Reviews 95
However, regardless of whether the different activist groups
position themselves along a more progressive or a more conservative
agenda, what they have in common in the different post-communist
countries is that they generally reject authority coming from above, be
it the state and its institutions or experts (most notably in the medical
field) both at home and abroad. The collection’s most important
contribution to scholarship is thus its invitation to a rethinking of the
dominant theoretical conceptualizations of civil society. Although
these parental movements from Central-East Europe and Russia do not
fit a liberal definition of civil society, one that emphasizes difference,
equality and plurality, they are nevertheless manifestations of civic
engagement, as ambiguous (and sometimes retrograde) as their agen-
das may appear to be.
The chapters are organized along three thematic clusters. The
first cluster (chapters 1, 2, and 3 by Tova Höjdestrand, Olena Strelnyk,
and Ina Dimitrova, respectively) examines conservative parental
activist groups in Russia, Ukraine and Bulgaria. Especially the chap-
ters dealing with Russia and the Ukraine show that this type of social
activism, although most immediately concerned with the welfare of
children and parents, i.e. what is generally regarded as the private
sphere, is connected to much broader political discourses and public
issues in their respective countries. These include questions all the way
from sexual education in schools and fears about homosexuality to
national sovereignty and geopolitical considerations regarding the EU
and the West in general.
The theme linking the second section of the volume (chapters
4, 5, 6, and 7, by Elżbieta Korolczuk/Renata E. Hryciuk, Pelle 
Åberg/Johnny Rodin, Iman Karzabi, and Steven Saxonberg, res-
pectively) is the activism of fathers’ groups in Poland, Russia,
Ukraine, and the Czech Republic. It is interesting to see some common
threads regarding gender policies and misogyny between the Polish
case and comparable groups in various Western countries, including
Canada, but also significant differences in the focus of fathers’ groups
from one country to the other, from the conservative-nationalist tone
of the Polish activists and anti-feminist sentiments of Czech fathers'
groups to the progressive (mainly urban middle-class based) daddy-
schools in Russia (Saint Petersburg).
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The third and last part of the book (chapters 8, 9, 10, and 11)
is concerned with parental groups’ resistance of state-imposed medical
and healthcare structures and practices, such as mandatory vaccination
in the Czech Republic (Jaroslava Hasmanová Marhánková), the situa-
tion of children with disabilities in the three Baltic states (Egle
Sumskiene), and alternative childbirth movements in the Czech
Republic (Ema Hrešanová) and in Hungary (Katalin Fábián). Fábián’s
chapter is particularly interesting as it demonstrates the transnational
profile of the Hungarian home-birth movement through the case of Dr.
Geréb.
In the conclusion, the editors summarize their book’s findings
and reflect on its theoretical contributions regarding a more nuanced
definition of civil society, one that would take into account the
complex political developments and realities of post-communist count-
ries while still remain in a dialogue with Western liberal ideas. Al-
though the parental movements discussed in the collection certainly
have their local specificities contingent on their particular historical
and cultural differences, the discourses they use and many of their
aspects and concerns demonstrate that there are also significant
commonalities between them, and also between them and similar
groups in the so-called West. Studying post-communist civil society
can thus help us see how interconnected the contemporary globalized
world is without taking away from local specificities and concerns.
Extensively researched, with a very solid literature review to
support and explain the positions of the editors and the volume’s
contributors and how their research differs from and builds on existing
scholarship, this volume will be an important addition not only to any
university library collection but also a valuable reading both for
scholars researching the impact of globalization on gender and civil
society and for any undergraduate or graduate course dealing not only




Ernő Munkácsi. How It Happened: Documenting the Tragedy of
Hungarian Jewry. Trans. Péter Balikó Lengyel. Ed. Nina Munk.
Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2018.
396 pages. ISBN 978-0-7735-5512-9
Edited by Nina Munk, and with introductory essays by historians
Ferenc Laczó and Susan Papp, Ernő Munkácsi’s How It Happened:
Documenting the Tragedy of Hungarian Jewry is an important con-
tribution to the history of the Holocaust in Hungary. First published in
Hungarian in 1947, How It Happened stands as an early and very
important assessment of the destruction of Hungarian Jewry during
World War II. Trained as a lawyer, Munkácsi served as chief secretary
of the Central Jewish Council in Budapest from Spring to mid-October
1944, and was in a unique position after the war to write of his
experience during the Holocaust, and to reflect on the actions (and
non-actions) of perpetrators, victims, and bystanders alike. Making
extensive use of documents that had survived the war, Munkácsi not
only explores the broader historical forces that culminated in the
genocide of Hungary’s Jews, but also recounts the confused, painful,
and often absurd day-to-day decisions that Jews were forced to make,
both individually and collectively, as the horror of the Holocaust un-
folded around them. Part critical analysis and part memoir, Munkácsi’s
account examines the complex array of “choiceless choices” that he
and the members of his community faced, and in so doing provides an
intimate if often tortured narrative that deserves to be read alongside
other similar examples of Holocaust life-writing, such as Adam
Czerniakow’s Warsaw Ghetto diary, or Béla Zsolt’s memoir Nine
Suitcases (which was first published in serial form between May 1946
and February 1947).
What will no doubt strike the reader from the outset is Mun-
kácsi’s critical and perhaps controversial assessment of the role that
the Jewish community played in laying the groundwork for their own
destruction. Munkácsi argues that internal divides combined with a
“sense of inertia” prevented Hungarian Jews from acting collectively
and decisively in the face of the Nazi threat. It was, in other words, not
just political division and disorganization within the community that
sealed their fate, but also the detached and myopic stance of the Jewish
leadership. Arguing that the vast majority of the Jewish leadership
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stood “aloof” from the broader community they should have been
serving, Munkácsi concludes that the inevitable gulf between Jewish
leaders and their people “prevented [them] in the most critical hours
from being able to exercise control over the large masses of Jews, let
alone influence their actions in any meaningful way” (10). Noting that
the Zionists were the only ones to fully realize and appreciate “the
sheer magnitude of the historic juncture around the corner” (15), Mun-
kácsi chastises other Jewish leaders who should have seen the writing
on the wall, and who should have done more for their people. “History
rarely produces accidents,” he writes, and thus “those familiar with the
woes and problems of Hungarian Jewry should have been able to
realize decades earlier that the tragedy would inevitably happen” (9).
The sense of inertia and tendency towards inaction that Mun-
kácsi identifies in the very first pages of his account are themes that he
returns to throughout the book, noting not only that many Jews, and
especially the most assimilated, had wrongly convinced themselves
that they held a special position within Hungarian society and were
thus “safe,” but also that the Jewish leadership had for decades proven
itself reluctant to stand up to a series of affronts and assaults, and that
they had chosen instead to suffer “a quick succession of fatal blows in
meek surrender” (148). Failed by its leaders, and split along social,
political, geographical, and religious lines, the Jewish community
within Hungary lacked both the solidarity and foresight needed to meet
the combined challenges of Hungarian antisemitism and Nazi terror.
By retreating into a politics of inaction, Jewish leaders put blind faith
in the hope that Hungary would prove an “exception” during the war,
and that it would remain a “tiny foothold of an island in a sea of
devastation” (12). Forced after the German invasion of Hungary in
March 1944 to confront the horrors of Hitler’s Final Solution, the
leadership nevertheless continued to “fumble” by continuing its policy
“of salvaging what it could” (65). Failing to deviate from an earlier
path, Jewish leaders instead chose to follow the path of least
resistance, clutching to the futile hope that they would escape their fate
if they simply obeyed the commands of their executioners.
Though much of Munkácsi’s account focuses on analyzing —
and perhaps rationalizing — the inaction and ineffectiveness of the
Jewish leadership during the Holocaust, the book itself is testament to
the cruelty perpetrated by Nazi genocidaires and their Hungarian
collaborators. As important as it was for Munkácsi to account for and
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understand Jewish decisions and (in)action, he is nevertheless very
clear that Hungarian Jews would never have been forced to confront
and ultimately live with the legacy of the “choiceless choices” pre-
sented to them by the architects of the Holocaust in Hungary were it
not for the intent and behavior of perpetrators whose culpability should
never be forgotten or underestimated. Munkácsi writes very clearly of
the “devilish cunning and unscrupulous hypocrisy” (17) of the occupy-
ing Germans, noting that the actions taken by the Nazis were both cold
and calculated. He is perhaps even more critical of the Hungarians
who collaborated with the Nazis, noting that German testimony im-
mediately following the war “revealed that the Gestapo had been so
massively understaffed in Hungary that they simply would not have
been able to carry out the deportations from the provinces without the
assistance of the Hungarian Gendarmerie” (132). Having been
abandoned by the Hungarian government, Jews were “at the mercy of
their enemies,” a fact that rendered Jewish resistance increasingly
difficult, if not impossible, especially when combined with the inef-
fective actions and misguided decisions of the Jewish leadership.
It is important to point out that Munkácsi does not consider all
Hungarians to be equally culpable or responsible for the fate of the
Jews in Hungary, though he does make it clear that a broader shift
within Hungarian society in the wake of World War I made it very
difficult, if not impossible, for non-Jewish Hungarians to act in a way
that would have mitigated or prevented the atrocities that were com-
mitted during World War II. Pointing to the role of the churches
during the “so-called Christian Era” — that is, the Horthy Era from
1919 to 1944 — Munkácsi claims that the clergy, alongside outspoken
Christian writers and politicians, contributed greatly to the erosion of
liberal structures and practices, and also to the deteriorating relation-
ship between Hungary’s Jewish and non-Jewish communities. Articles
published in newspapers by “the lesser clergy with the purpose of
inciting hatred against the Jewry,” for example, coupled with Christian
politicians (many of them priests) who “distinguished themselves as
ardent anti-Semites” in the National Assembly as early as the 1920s
served to displace and stigmatize Hungarian Jews in the interwar
period (160). Despite the “heroic struggles” of some Christians, Hun-
gary’s Jewish community obviously could not be saved, though Mun-
kácsi is quick to point out that a different path would have been very
difficult to forge given the antisemitic conditions prevailing in Hun-
gary at the time. He concludes, however, that “had the churches
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evinced more verve, courage, and resolve, they would have been able
to point the way out of the cataclysm for those Hungarians who had
not been tainted by fascism” (173).
Particularly haunting in light of Munkácsi’s assessment of the
lack of effective resistance on the part of Jews and “righteous Christi-
ans” alike is his analysis of the appearance and reception in Hungary
of the Auschwitz Protocols in 1944. Though these Protocols provided
a clear description of the concentration camp and its horrors, Munkácsi
suggests that their dissemination in Hungary did not embolden the
resistance of Jews or righteous Christians as “neither side had the
strength to act.” Likening the Holocaust in Hungary to the terminal
phase of a disease, Munkácsi concludes: “Never before had we
glimpsed the true depth of the abyss, to the brink of which we had
been pushed by twenty-five years of antisemitism, the plague spread
by the anti-Jewish laws, a shackled press, and everything that every
Hungarian government from Gömbös to Sztójay stood for. Most of the
country had fallen for the fascist propaganda, and could hardly wait for
the next anti-Jewish measure to be issued. They were eager to witness
the progress of deportations from the provinces and, more important,
eager to finally lay their hands on what mattered to them most: their
share of the spoils” (131-132).
Writing in the immediate wake of the Holocaust, Munkácsi
was convinced that “a full balance of accounts” would emerge with the
passing of time. He was confident that future generations of Hungari-
ans would be able to trace out a much fuller picture of the tragedy he
had just lived through, and that a more accurate understanding of the
intent and actions of “the real makers of history” would ultimately
emerge (65). Yet, a full seventy-five years later, scholars still debate
the difficult questions raised by commentators like Munkácsi, and
have yet to agree on what course of action Jews and their allies might
have taken to alter the fate of those who suffered and perished during
the Holocaust. Hungarian society, moreover, still struggles to re-
cognize and account for its own role in the Holocaust, a task made all
the more difficult by a current regime bent on burying rather than
understanding certain aspects of the nation’s past. For these reasons
alone, How It Happened is a welcomed and important addition to the
history of the Holocaust, both in Hungary and in general.
Nina Munk has done an excellent job as editor in assembling a
team of scholars capable of putting Munkácsi’s work in historical
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context. Though short and to the point, Papp’s essay provides just
enough information on the life and times of Munkácsi to help provide
the reader with a clear sketch of the world that he and his family
inhabited. Laczó’s essay, in turn, offers nuanced insight into Mun-
kácsi’s text, and helps to situate his observations and conclusions in a
critical historiographical context. Regardless of whether the reader
empathizes with Munkácsi’s situation, or dismisses his analysis as an
attempt to distance himself from the actions of the Central Jewish
Council that he served during the Holocaust, his account is a painful
reflection on how difficult it is to see a dangerous situation “properly,”
and how profoundly challenging it is to organize and mobilize people
quickly and effectively against such a profound existential threat. Be-
yond its value as a primary source, Munkácsi’s account is compelling
as a human story, and will no doubt prove to be provocative reading
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Our journal plans to publish a review of this book in its 2019 volume.
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Obituary
Steven Béla Várdy (1935 – 2018)
Béla Várdy, a.k.a. Steven B. Várdy, was Professor of History and
McAnulty Distinguished Professor of History at Duquesne University
in Pittsburgh, PA. He was born in Bercel, Nógrád County, in what is
now northern Hungary — and came to the United States with his par-
ents in 1951. He received his education in his native country, in Ger-
many and in the United States — where he earned a doctoral degree at
Indiana University. He taught at Duquesne University for five decades.
For some time he acted as chairman of his department and was one of
the most prolific of its members. A selective list of his publications in
English alone fills more than 30 pages (see Richard Mulcahy, ed.
Hungary Through the Centuries: Studies in Honor of Professors Ste-
ven Béla Várdy and Agnes Huszár Várdy, [Boulder, CO: East Euro-
pean Monographs, 2011, pp. 563-594]. One of the most widely used of
Dr. Várdy’s books is probably his Historical Dictionary of Hungary
(Lanham, Md.: the Scarecrow Press, 1997, 812 pages). According to
the website worldcat.org Várdy’s books — at least one of them — can
be found in close to 4,000 libraries world wide. More than a dozen of
Várdy’s publications have appeared over the decades in our journal —
some of them co-written with his wife Agnes Huszár Várdy who
taught at Pittsburgh’s Robert Morris College (later University).
What made Professor Várdy different from many other Hun-
garian university teachers who lived and taught in the United States
was the emphasis he placed on ties to his native land. Throughout his
professional career he regularly visited Hungary, cultivated scholarly
contacts there, and kept publishing in the Magyar language. Even his
magnum opus appeared there: Magyarok az Újvilágban — Hungarians
in the New World (Budapest: A Magyar Nyelv és Kultúra Nemzetközi
Társasága, 2000, 840 pages). He often declared his wish that, after his
An Obituary104
104
death, he would like to rest in Hungarian soil. His wish was granted.
He died, after a long struggle with diseases of old age, in July, 2018, a
few days after he returned to his native land for the last time. With his
passing, our journal lost one of its most productive contributors.
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